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ABSTRACT 
 
PSYCHOPATHY AND CORPORATE CRIME 
(August 2011) 
 
Angela Dawn Pardue, B.A., The University of North Carolina at Charlotte 
 
M.S., Appalachian State University 
 
Chairperson:  Matthew B. Robinson 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the relationship between psychopathy and 
corporate crime.  Psychopathy is illustrated by characteristics such as glib/superficiality, 
impression management, pathological lying, conning/manipulativeness, lack or remorse or 
guilt, callousness/lack of empathy, failure to accept responsibility, stimulation seeking, 
irresponsibility, parasitic orientation, serious criminal behavior, and criminal versatility.  
Although the American Psychological Association (APA) has equated psychopathy with 
Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD), the two constructs are not identical.  The primary 
diagnostic tool used to assess psychopathy is the PCL-R.  While those diagnosed with 
psychopathy are likely to meet the diagnostic criteria for ASPD, those diagnosed with ASPD 
do not often meet the diagnostic standard for psychopathy.  Psychopathy has traditionally 
been used to understand violent street level offenses, such as assault and homicide.  
However, as this thesis demonstrates, psychopathy is also related to corporate crime.  Using 
recent examples of corporate wrongdoing committed in the oil, automobile, and financial 
industries, I explore ways in which the behaviors of corporations are consistent with 
psychopathy.   
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CHAPTER 1: 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 According to DeLisi and Vaughn (2008, p. 164), “There is a synergy between the 
violent criminals‟ personality traits, lifestyle, and observed behavior that dovetails so 
exquisitely that it is as if their criminality is wrapped up in a box.  That box is psychopathy” 
(as cited in DeLisi, 2009).  The relationship between psychopathy and violent street-level 
offenses has been well established (Walsh, Swogger, & Kosson, 2009; Raine & Sanmartin, 
2001).  However, psychopathic characteristics and behaviors have been normalized, 
tolerated, and even valued among corporate offenders (Robinson & Murphy, 2009).  There is 
a paucity of research that explores the relationship between psychopathy and forms of elite 
deviance and, as such, the connection between psychopathy and acts of elite deviance, such 
as corporate crime, warrants further academic attention. 
 This thesis attempts to fill this gap by exploring the relationship between psychopathy 
and corporate crime.  Psychopathy is characterized by glib/superficial charm, impression 
management, a grandiose sense of self-worth, pathological lying, conning/manipulativeness, 
lack of empathy, lack of guilt or remorse, shallow affect, and failure to accept responsibility 
(Hare & Neumann, 2006).  Impression management is indicated by efforts put forth by 
individuals in order to be viewed by others in a socially desirable or favorable manner 
(Montagliani & Giacalone, 1998; Sato & Nihei, 2009).  Grandiosity is typified by an 
excessive need for admiration, arrogance, sense of entitlement, envy, and exploitative 
tendencies towards others (Brown, Budzek, & Tamborski, 2009).  According to Dike (2008), 
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pathological lying is marked by a long history of frequent and repeated lying.  
Manipulativeness is characterized by charm, deceit, risk-taking, and carelessness about rules 
and conventions (Zibarras, Port, & Woods, 2008).  Empathy has been defined as “the ability 
to detect accurately the emotional information being transmitted by another person” 
(Levenson and Ruef, 1992, p. 234).  Guilt “refers to the private feelings of a troubled 
conscious caused by a personal wrongdoing or by disadvantaging a valued other” (Silfver 
and Helkama, 2007, p. 239).  Although they are capable of concealing their emotional 
deficits, psychopaths are not capable of experiencing or appreciating everyday emotions, 
demonstrating a shallow affect (Williamson, Harpur, & Hare, 1991).  Psychopaths tend to 
rationalize and justify their behavior, often blaming others rather than accepting 
responsibility for their own actions (Hare, 2003).   
 While there has been little research conducted on psychopathy and corporate 
offending, personality traits such as interpersonal competitiveness, positive extroversion, 
agreeableness, and neuroticism have emerged as principal personality correlates of white-
collar offending (Alalehto, 2003; Feeley, 2006).  Interpersonal competitiveness is defined as 
extreme competition in which individuals are motivated to avoid loss and to defeat their rival 
counterparts.  Positive extroversion is characterized by individuals who are talkative and 
spontaneous.  In contrast, the disagreeable businessman is defined by characteristics such as 
bitterness, having condescending attitudes towards co-workers, and being easily angered or 
frustrated at unplanned circumstances and inconsistencies with order, rules, and corporate 
customs.  Neuroticism is defined by traits such as anxiety, insecurity, sloppiness, and low 
self-esteem.  While these traits explain corporate offending, other characteristics, such as 
those typical of psychopathy, can be extended to many of the traits and behaviors of elite 
PSYCHOPATHY AND CORPORATE CRIME  3 
 
 
criminals.  As this thesis demonstrates, corporate behaviors illustrate several traits that are 
consistent with psychopathy.   
 Chapter two introduces the concept of corporate crime, offering reasons as to why the 
issue has been neglected both in the academic literature and by the criminal justice system.  
Several theoretical explanations of corporate violence are reviewed, including self-control 
theory, general strain theory, institutional anomie theory, social learning theory, and 
contextual anomie/strain theory.   
 Chapter three describes the development of the psychological construct of 
psychopathy, distinguishing it from the closely-related Antisocial Personality Disorder 
(ASPD).  Next, the relationship between psychopathy and street-level offenses is reviewed 
with a brief overview of a small portion of studies conducted on psychopathy and offenses 
such as sexual assault and homicide.  This is followed by a brief review of the literature 
relevant to personality, psychopathy, and elite crime.   
 Chapter four consists of examples of corporate wrongdoing across a variety of 
industries, including the oil, automobile, and financial industries.  The actions of companies 
such as British Petroleum, Toyota, General Motors, Enron, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Nike, 
and General Electric are discussed.  These behaviors have resulted in the loss of life, 
environmental damage, inhumane labor practices, and other negative consequences.   
 Chapter five follows with the application of these examples to traits associated with 
psychopathy, including glib/superficiality, impression management, lack of empathy, lack of 
guilt or remorse, pathological lying, and conning/manipulativeness.  In addition, personality 
constructs related to corporate offending, such as the desire for control and 
openness/intellect, are analyzed.   
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 Chapter six closes with a succinct review, discussion, and future implications for 
social science research and criminal justice polices.  Many acts of elite deviance are left 
unaddressed by current criminal justice policies.  Likewise, the study of elite deviance has 
been neglected in the academic literature.  Future research should continue to explore the 
emerging relationship between corporate crime and psychopathy.  Criminal justice policies 
should effectively target issues such as corporate crime and other acts of wrongdoing 
committed by elite members of society.   
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CHAPTER 2: 
 
CORPORATE CRIME 
 
 
Henry and Lanier (1998) developed an integrated definitional model of crime that 
they referred to as the “prism of crime.”  The prism of crime was created by placing an 
inverted pyramid beneath an upright pyramid.  The upper pyramid symbolizes highly visible 
crimes, while the lower pyramid represents invisible crimes.  Highly visible crimes are 
typically those committed in public by the powerless.  These include street offenses such as 
robbery, theft, auto theft, burglary, assault, murder, stranger rape, and arson.  Invisible crimes 
include crimes of the powerful, such as offenses committed by government officials, 
corporations, and organizations; fraud, embezzlement; and even offenses such as date rape, 
sexual harassment, domestic violence, sexism, racism, ageism, and hate crimes.  Such crimes 
are generally perpetrated in private settings such as organizations, workplaces, and homes.  
In addition, they typically involve relationships in which trust is violated.   
The majority of people regard criminal behavior in terms of legal definitions, which 
only include acts that violate the written criminal law (Robinson, 2009).  These include street 
or serious crimes such as homicide, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, motor vehicle 
theft, and arson.  These types of crimes are currently the most targeted by criminal justice 
agencies under the Crime Control Model, which emphasizes the protection of communities 
by lowering crime rates, even at the cost of mistakenly convicting the innocent (Robinson, 
2009).  The Crime Control Model places high value on informal processes, such as plea 
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bargaining, focusing on efficient ways to quickly process a high volume of criminal cases 
while devaluing individual rights and due process.  Since the law defines crime, any behavior 
can become criminalized and a behavior becomes a crime only when it is defined as such by 
the government (Robinson, 2009).  Simon (2006) described elite deviance as acts committed 
by elites or the organizations they lead, which result in physical, financial, or moral harm to 
include economic domination, government and governmental control, and denial of basic 
human rights.  The consequences of elite deviance include death and injuries that occur due 
to disregard for workers‟ health and safety, diminished public confidence in American 
economic and political elites, racial and class biases in criminal law and its enforcement, 
monetary cost leading to inflation, and an increase in organized crime (Simon, 2006).   
 In contrast to street level offenses, acts of elite deviance may fall beyond the scope of 
codified criminal law.  Furthermore, many acts of elite deviance do not actually violate the 
law, but still have multiple adverse consequences for society (Passas, 2005).  In fact, elite 
offenses cause significantly greater harm than street level offenses.  For example, corporate 
and white-collar property crimes cause an estimated $404 billion in damages, while street 
level property damages are estimated to only cost $20 billion (Robinson & Murphy, 2009).   
Still, crimes committed by elites are rarely targeted under the current Crime Control Model 
(Robinson, 2009).   
Elite deviance is characterized by illegal and/or unethical behavior, the maintenance 
or increase in profit and/or power for economic and political organizations, the open or 
covert assistance and support from elites who oversee such organizations, and the 
participation of elite and/or employees that work for people who are wealthy and/or powerful 
(Simon, 2006).  Elite deviance encompasses a wide variety of behaviors, such as white-collar 
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crime, corporate crime, corporate violence, occupational crime, governmental deviance, 
crimes of the state, crimes of privilege, profit without honor, and crimes by any other name 
(Robinson, 2009).   
There has been a great deal of definitional ambiguity surrounding the 
conceptionalization of white-collar and corporate crime (Coleman, 2006; Hartley, 2008; 
Simon & Hagan, 1999).  Sutherland (1949, p. 9) first defined white-collar crime as “a crime 
committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his 
occupation.”  A more recent definition describes white-collar crime as “illegal or unethical 
acts that violate fiduciary responsibility or public trust, committed by an individual or 
organization, usually during the course of legitimate occupational activities, by persons of 
high or respectable social status for personal or organizational gain” (Helmkamp, Ball, & 
Townsend, 1996, p. 351).  Hartley (2008, p. 6) described corporate crime as acts that 
essentially benefit the corporation itself and white-collar crime as acts that benefit the 
individuals who work in a corporation.  However, he acknowledged that there is some 
overlap between the two.  For the purposes of this thesis, I focus primarily on corporate 
crime and provide only limited information regarding individuals within corporations.   
Corporate crime has been defined as wrongdoing committed by corporate officials for 
the benefit of their corporation and offenses of the corporation itself (Clinard & Quinney, 
1986).  According to Hartley (2008, p. 1), “For criminologists, „corporate crime‟ refers to 
acts in violation of the law that are committed by businesses, corporations, or individuals 
within those entities.”  In addition to violations of the existing law, corporations may commit 
acts that, while legal, have many negative social consequences (Passas, 2005).  For this 
reason, definitions of corporate crime should include any harmful actions caused by 
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negligent, reckless, or intentional behaviors that are both lawful and illegal.  Frank and 
Lynch (1992, p. 17) defined corporate crime as, “socially injurious and blameworthy acts, 
legal or illegal, that cause financial, physical, or environmental harm, committed by 
corporations and businesses against their workers, the general public, the environment, other 
corporations and businesses, the government, or other countries.”   
Street-level offenses are described as highly visible crimes that cause evident harm to 
individual victims and society at large (Henry & Lanier, 1998).  Acts of elite deviance are 
described as invisible crimes (Henry & Lanier, 1998).  Robinson and Murphy (2009) pointed 
out some key differences between corporate violence and street violence. Street violence is 
direct, results in immediate harm, often involves only an individual offender, has various 
motivations, and is intentional.  In contrast, corporate violence is often indirect, results in 
delayed harm, involves multiple offenders, is financially motivated, and entails culpability.  
First, acts of corporate wrongdoing do not involve an offender directly harming another like 
street level crimes, but are caused by corporate actions and policies that expose people to 
potential harms.  Second, street offenses result in immediate harm, while the harm caused by 
corporate violence often occurs days, weeks, months, or even years after corporate decisions 
are implemented.  Third, street violence is typically committed by one individual or a small 
group of people while corporate violence involves a very large number of people within one 
or multiple organizations.  In addition, while street crimes may or may not be motivated by 
monetary gain, corporate crime is motivated by profit maximization.  Lastly, whereas street 
level offenses result from intentional acts, corporate level offenses are typically caused by 
culpable behaviors in which harm is a negative consequence rather than deliberate.  
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However, it is important to note that even acts attributed to negligence and carelessness may 
be committed deliberately or at least with awareness of potential risks.     
Examples of Corporate Wrongdoing 
 In The Corporation:  The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power, Joel Bakan 
(2004) discusses several examples of corporate wrongdoing.  For instance, American 
corporations such as Nike, The Gap, Kathy Lee Gifford‟s clothing line, and Walmart, often 
exploit impoverished countries for cheap and easy labor.  Twenty-two separate operations 
take place to produce one Nike shirt.  Five steps involve cutting the material, 11 steps involve 
sewing, and six steps involve attaching labels, hang tags, and packaging.  The estimated 
maximum time to manufacture one shirt was 6.6 minutes, which cost $0.08 in labor and sold 
for $22.99.  Typical sweatshop conditions are harsh and inhumane.  Aside from receiving 
very little pay, employees in these situations are often humiliated and abused.  Young girls 
are forced to take pregnancy tests and are fired if the results are positive.  These facilities are 
usually located in secret, guarded locations and surrounded by barbed wire.  Further, 
employees are often housed in substandard living conditions by the corporations they work 
for. 
 In 1938, President Franklin Roosevelt passed the Fair Labor Standards Act, which 
banned sweatshops, child labor, and industrial homework.  However, the act is routinely 
violated by the garment industry and many sweatshops remain in operation both domestically 
and abroad.  Only 33% of the garment industry is in compliance with the law.  According to 
Charles Kernaghan, director of the National Labor Committee, sixty-five percent of clothing 
operations in New York City are sweatshops.  Many sweatshops in the United States employ 
illegal immigrants (Bakan, 2004).    
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 According to Sutherland (1983) many state statutes label individuals with four 
convictions as “habitual criminals” (p. 23).  He also pointed out that the habitual offenses of 
corporations demonstrate the inability of conventional criminological theories to explain acts 
of wrongdoing committed by corporations.  In his study, Sutherland (1949, 1983) used the 
records of court decisions and administrative commissions regarding 70 of the largest 
manufacturing, mining, and mercantile corporations in the United States.  His analysis 
focused on violations such as restraint of trade, misrepresentation in advertising, 
infringement of patent, trademarks and copyrights, unfair labor practices, rebates, financial 
fraud and violation of trust, violations of war regulations, and other miscellaneous offenses.  
He found that a total of 980 decisions were made regarding the 70 corporations with an 
average of 14 decisions for each one.  Of these, 158 (16%) were made by criminal courts.  Of 
the sample, 97.1% were found to be recidivist, having two or more adverse decisions.   
 Bakan (2004) also discusses the habitual nature of some corporations in committing 
corporate offense.  For example, Multinational Monitor organized a list of over forty 
infractions committed by General Electric between 1990 and 2001.  The list included, but 
was not limited to, the following charges: 
March 27, 1990:  Wilmington, North Carolina:  GE fined $20,000 for discrimination 
against employees who reported safety violations. 
 
May 20, 1991:  Washington, D.C.:  GE ordered to pay $1 million in damages over 
improperly tested aircraft parts for Air Force and Navy.   
 
February 27, 1992:  Allentown, Pennsylvania:  GE ordered to pay $80 million in 
damages for design flaws in nuclear plants. 
 
March 13, 1992:  Wilmington, North Carolina:  GE fined $20,000 for safety 
violations at nuclear fuel plant. 
 
July 22, 1992:  Washington, D.C.:  GE fined $70 million for money laundering and 
fraud related to the illegal sale of fighter jets to Israel. 
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March 2, 1993:  Riverside, California:  GE and others ordered to pay $96 million in 
damages for contamination from dumping industrial chemicals.   
 
October 11, 1993:  San Francisco, California:  GE ordered to offer $3.25 million in 
rebates to consumers after deceptive lightbulb advertising. 
 
September 14, 1994:  Washington, D.C.:  GE fined $20 million for overcharges on 
defense contracts.   
 
October 7, 1996:  Hendersonville, North Carolina:  GE ordered to clean up 
contaminated soil and groundwater. 
 
January 24, 1999:  Piscataway, New Jersey:  GE ordered to reimburse consumers 
$147 million for unfair debt collection practices (Bakan, 2004, pp. 75-79).   
 
A well-publicized example of corporate crime is the 2001 Enron scandal.  Problems 
began appearing at Enron as early as 1987, only two years after the company was created.  
Kenneth Lay, CEO of Enron from 1986 to 2002, was indicted in 2004 for 11 charges, 
including securities and wire fraud, making false statements, and misleading the public and 
Enron investors.  Several other individuals, such as chairman and former CEO Jeffrey 
Skilling and chief financial officer Andrew Fastow were also involved in the Enron scandal 
(Fersch, 2006).  Bankers from several financial institutions, including Canadian Imperial 
Bank of Commerce, Bank America, Barclays Banks, and Deutsche Bank, were implicated in 
the Enron scandal.  Allegations included insider trading and deceptive transactions.  
JPMorgan Chase and Citigroup were among Enron‟s largest creditors.  They used a tactic 
known as prepay that allowed Enron to borrow money and label it as revenue, enabling the 
company to accumulate about nine billion dollars in the decade leading up to the collapse 
(Fersch, 2006).    
Lay is accused of convincing investors to have confidence in the company, while 
earning hundreds of millions of dollars by placing shares in stock and selling before 
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shareholders had a chance to notice.  He held a Master‟s Degree in Economics from the 
University of Missouri and apparently had to work odd jobs to help his family make ends 
meet after losing their savings by gambling (Fersch, 2006).  Lay began his career working for 
a company that later became part of Exxon.  Later he served as an officer in the U.S. Navy 
and worked as an economist at the Pentagon focusing on military spending before working 
for other companies, such as Florida Gas, Transo, and Houston Natural Gas.  During this 
time he also completed a Ph.D. in Economics (McLean & Elkind, 2003).  He initiated the 
merging of Houston Natural Gas and InterNorth, which is the merger that later formed 
Enron.  Following the merger, Enron oil remained a hidden division of Enron and in Enron‟s 
financial reports, earnings from oil-trading were not separated, nor brought to the attention of 
Wall Street.  Instead, the traders worked to improve Enron‟s financial appearance (McLean 
& Elkind, 2003). 
With Lay serving as CEO, Enron become the world‟s largest energy trader having 
investments and assets of over twenty billion dollars.  Lay passed his position of CEO to 
Jeffrey Skilling in 2001 (Fersch, 2006).  Shortly after Enron reported that $638 billion had 
been lost during the third quarter of the fiscal year and the company filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy.  The government accused Lay of being aware of the condition of his company 
and of helping officers Skilling and Fastow hide losses from investors and lie about the state 
of the company.  However, Lay claimed that he too was a victim and was not aware of the 
deeds of Fastow.   
Skilling, equipped with an MBA from Harvard and working as a consultant from 
McKinsey & Company, had impressed CEO Lay so much while working together that Lay 
offered him the job of CEO in 1990 (Fersch, 2006).  The two also become close friends.  By 
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1997, Skilling was named President and Chief Operating Officer of Enron.  Skilling told Lay 
that he would like to use what is known as mark-to-market accounting, rather than the 
traditional historical-cost accounting, and that he would not work for Enron unless allowed 
to do so (McLean & Elkind, 2003).  He quickly resigned from the position after only six 
months and abruptly sold all of his Enron shares, which had a net worth of $60 million.  
Three months later Enron filed for bankruptcy.  Skilling was charged with dozens of counts 
of fraud, insider trading, and related offenses.   
Fastow, who held an MBA from Northwestern University, served as Enron‟s Chief 
Financial Officer.  He was hired by Skilling, who was impressed with his asset securitization 
skills, to work for the company in the 1980s.  Fastow developed special purpose entities that 
absorbed Enron‟s debt.  He also established Chewco, a partnership of Enron employees, 
which hid losses by deceptively listing assets allowing Enron to overstate its earnings by one 
billion dollars in 2000-2001 (Fersch, 2006).  Fastow and his team created off-balance sheet 
vehicles, complex financing structures, and other instruments so complicated that few can 
understand them even today (McLean & Elkind, 2003).  He was fired just as the collapse of 
Enron began and was indicted on seventy-eight federal charges related to fraud.   
There are countless other examples of corporate wrongdoing.  Robinson and Murphy 
(2009) discuss several different types of corporate violations, including fraud, deceptive 
advertising, defective products, and deadly products.  Fraud is defined as a form of theft in 
which the consumer is deprived of their money or property through deceit, trickery, or lies.  
Fraud occurs across a wide array of industries in a variety of contexts, such as consumer 
fraud, insurance fraud, credit card and check fraud, cellular phone fraud, health care fraud, 
Medicare and Medicaid fraud, telemarketing fraud, securities and commodities fraud, and 
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automotive fraud.  Quackery is a form of fraud that advertises worthless medical products, 
such as drugs, devices, and nutritional products.  For example, diet and nutrition companies, 
such as Diet Centers, NordicTrack, Jenny Craig, Nutri/System, Physicians Weight Loss 
Centers, and SlimAmerica have been accused of fraud.  In addition, Robinson and Murphy 
(2009) discuss fraudulent crimes involving the Saving & Loan scandals, as well as 
corporations such as WorldCom, Qwest, Tyco, ImClone, Global Crossing, Dynergy, CMS 
Energy, El Paso Corp., Halliburton, Williams Cos., AOL Time Warner, Saloman Smith 
Barney, Shering Plough, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Kmart, Johnson & Johnson, Adelphia, 
Merrill Lynch, Rite Aid, and Coca-Cola.   
The tactic of deceptive advertising involves using marketing experts to invent 
effective ads on sample market populations.  For example, advertisements may be designed 
to primarily entice young people to use age-specific illegal products such as alcohol or 
tobacco.  Deceptive advertising is defined as a form of fraud in which a product is marketed 
using false or misleading claims  (Robinson & Murphy, 2009).   
The manufacturing and selling of defective products involves furnishing a good or 
product that is unreasonably dangerous to consumers (Robinson & Murphy, 2009).  
Defective products are manufactured and sold across a variety of industries, including 
products such as automobiles, appliances, childrens‟ toys, car seats, lawn products, electronic 
devices, home improvement and home furnishing products, food and beverages, drug and 
health products, and even safety products like gun trigger locks and carbon monoxide and 
smoke detectors.  Even products used by criminal justice agencies such as bullet proof vests 
and electronic monitoring bracelets have been found to be defective.  There have been 
millions of toy recalls for products manufactured by corporations such as Mattel, Fisher-
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Price, and Toys „R Us, because of issues such as the use of dangerous amounts of lead paint, 
cadmium, arsenic, mercury, and polyvinyl chloride (PVC) plastic (Robinson & Murphy, 
2009).  In addition, products such as tobacco are obviously deadly.   
Theoretical Explanations of Corporate Crime 
  A variety of modern theoretical explanations of criminal behavior have been put 
forth in the criminological literature.  Among these are Self-Control Theory (Gottfredson & 
Hirschi, 1990), General Strain Theory (Agnew, 2006), Institutional Anomie Theory (Messner 
& Rosenfeld, 2007), Contextual Anomie/Strain Theory (Robinson & Murphy, 2009), and 
Social Learning theories (Tarde, 1968; Bandura, 1973; Bandura, 1977; Sutherland, 1947).  
Each of these theories and their relevancy for understanding the entire spectrum of criminal 
behavior, including both street and elite offenses, are summarized in what follows.   
Self-Control Theory 
 Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) attempted to explain criminal behavior using the 
construct of self-control.  Self-Control Theory assumes that the lack of self-control is natural 
and that self-control must be learned through the process of socialization.  Self-control is 
viewed as being stable across the lifespan, and therefore, it is assumed that children and 
adolescents low in self-control will have low self-control as adults.  Individuals who are low 
in self-control are likely to be impulsive, insensitive, physical, short-sighted, non-verbal, 
risk-taking, and egocentric; and are, consequently, more likely to engage in criminal and 
analogous behaviors more frequently.  According to the authors, criminology has 
traditionally ignored behaviors that are analogous to crime, such as smoking, alcohol use, and 
accidents, in regards to both causation and social reactions.   
 To demonstrate how levels of self-control differ among individuals, factors associated 
with self-control are traced back to two general sources.  The first is the degree that traits 
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related to self-control vary among individuals.  The second includes ways in which 
caretakers are able to recognize self-control, the consequences of self-control, and their 
ability to correct behaviors associated with low self-control.  According to Gottfredson and 
Hirschi (1990), the primary causal factor associated with low self-control is ineffective child-
rearing.   
 Self-Control Theory was intended to explain all crime at all times, as well as 
behaviors that are not defined as law violations by the state.  However, while Gottfredson 
and Hirschi‟s theory of low self-control proposes some insights to street level offenses, it 
offers little efforts aimed at explaining elite deviance.  For example, they identified several 
elements of self-control including immediate, easy, and simple gratification; few or meager 
long term benefits; and little skill or planning (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990, p. 89).  
Conversely, white-collar and corporate deviants may exercise a great deal of caution and 
planning, enjoy an abundance of long term benefits, and must possess at least some sort of 
skill set.   
The authors admit that their theory only predicts a low rate of offending among 
white-collar and corporate workers.  They argue that standard viewpoints of white-collar 
offending are based on misleading statistics, such as those generated by using organizations, 
rather than individuals, as units of analysis.  Also, they reject widely-accepted typological 
approaches to crime that distinguish among street, white-collar, and corporate crime.  
Because low self-control is quite antithetical to individuals who are able to secure regular 
employment and to achieve positions within businesses and corporations, they expect that 
their theory demonstrates a low tendency toward criminal behavior among white-collar and 
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corporate workers.  However, within these groups, the authors argue that there should be 
notable differences in self-control between those who offend and those who do not.   
General Strain Theory 
 According to Agnew‟s (2006) General Strain Theory (GST), crime occurs as a result 
of individual experiences with strain.  Strains are defined as circumstances that are disliked 
and/or cause discomfort.  Objective strains are those that are generally disliked by everyone, 
while subjective strains involve the extent of dislike experienced by a particular person.  
Three major types of strain include (1) the loss of something valuable, (2) negative treatment 
from others, and (3) failure to achieve goals.  Crime is viewed as a means to reduce or escape 
strain, obtain revenge, or to alleviate negative emotion.  Individuals who lack the ability to 
cope in legal ways, are disposed to crime, and view the cost of criminal coping as low, are 
more likely to cope with strain through crime.  Personality traits, goals, values, and previous 
experiences are among the multitude of factors that influence an individual‟s reaction to 
strain.  Chronic or repeated exposure to strains can create a general disposition for criminal 
behavior.   
 Not all individuals are likely to respond to strains with criminal behavior.  According 
to Agnew (2006), those who do engage in criminal behavior do so in order to cope with 
strain.  Crime is viewed as a means to reduce or escape the strain, obtain revenge, or to 
alleviate negative emotion.  Individuals who lack the ability to cope in legal ways, are 
disposed to crime, and view the cost of criminal coping as low, are more likely to cope with 
strain through crime.  Strains may lead to particular crimes because they create negative 
emotional states and pressure for corrective action.  Strains can decrease coping strategies 
and the costs of offending, and increase criminal disposition.  They can also reduce social 
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controls and facilitate the social learning of crime.  Chronic or repeated exposure to strains 
can create a general disposition for criminal behavior.   
Some individuals are more likely to respond to strain with crime than others.  
Individual reactions depend on the characteristics of the strains one experiences, their own 
traits and abilities, and the environment.  Three general categories of coping strategies 
include behavioral, cognitive, and emotional coping strategies.  Individuals who (1) have 
poor coping skills, (2) have inadequate social support, (3) have low levels of self control, (4) 
associate with other criminals and have tolerable attitudes toward crime, and (5) are in 
situations in which the benefits of crime outweigh the costs are more likely to cope with 
strain through crime.   
 Strains that are likely to increase crime for juveniles include those that involve family 
members and/or school officials.  Examples of such strains include parental rejection, 
neglect, abuse, family conflict, poor grades, and poor relations with teachers.  Strains that are 
likely to increase the likelihood of offending for adults involve marital and employment 
problems.  These include separation/divorce, chronic unemployment, and employment in a 
secondary labor market.  Strains that increase the likelihood of offending for both juveniles 
and adults include victimization, discrimination, and homelessness.  In contrast, proper 
application of punishment, the belief that one will not achieve their goals, and poor peer 
relationships are less likely to result in crime.  Generally, strains that are most likely to cause 
crime are (1) viewed as unjust, (2) viewed as high in magnitude, (3) associated with low 
social control, and (4) create pressure or incentive for criminal coping.    
 General Strain Theory can explain differences in offending when controlling for 
gender, class, and race as well as community and societal differences in crime rates.  
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Previous research relevant to General Strain Theory has generally emphasized street level 
and status offenses (Agnew, 1999; Warner & Fowler, 2003, Baron, 2004; Froggio, 2007; 
Baron, 2008).  However, General Strain Theory can be used to explain acts of white-collar 
offenders and even terrorists (Agnew, 2006, p. 16).  Indeed strains characterized by financial, 
goal-related, and economic inequality can offer some insights to various forms of white-
collar offenses.  Financial, goal-related, and economic strains coupled with the competitive 
corporate environment can be extended to explanations of corporate crime, contributing to 
behavior that is focused on alleviating strains related to individual and corporate financial 
gains, individual advancement within an organization, and corporate progress in the global 
market at large.  Langton and Piquero (2007) found that individuals who reported strain were 
more likely to be financially motivated to commit white-collar crimes.   
Institutional Anomie Theory 
 Messner and Rosenfeld‟s modern version of strain theory uses basic sociological 
concepts to explain increasingly high levels of crime in the United States.  The authors 
acknowledged that crime in the United States is exceptionally high and distinct from that of 
similarly developed nations, partially due to sociocultural factors that have a significant 
impact on American views and ways of life.  Institutional Anomie Theory (IAT) consists of 
two components that interact with one another to produce high levels of crime.  These 
components are culture and social structure.   
  Culture interacts with the existing social structure in a way that encourages crime.  
Cultural components include people‟s values and beliefs, while social structure describes 
people‟s roles and positions in society.  The imbalance of power between economic and 
noneconomic institutions is the socially structured component of IAT, which leads to weak 
institutional control and inadequate support for noneconomic institutions, such as the family, 
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educational system, and the political system.  The implications for the combination of 
cultural views and institutional imbalance of power are high levels of crime.  According to 
Messner and Rosenfeld (2007), crime in the United States often occurs “by any means 
necessary” (p. 21).   
 The cultural element of Institutional Anomie Theory is centered around the notion of 
the American Dream, which leads to pressure for economic success and anomie.  The term 
anomie, coined by sociologist Émile Durkheim, refers to “a weakening of normative order in 
society” (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 11).  The American Dream is defined as “a broad 
cultural ethos that entails a commitment to the goal of material success, to be pursued by 
everyone in society, under conditions of open, individual competition” (Messner & 
Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 6).  Messner and Rosenfeld argue that the American Dream socializes 
people to seek out economic success and to believe that their chances of achieving economic 
success are relatively high.  This facilitates the ongoing pursuit of rarely-achieved aspirations 
and material gains.  This focus on material success undermines the importance of 
noneconomic structures, such as those related to education, family, and politics.  The 
universal acceptance and pursuit of the American Dream creates a number of obstacles for 
people since the reality is that the existing social structure creates economic inequality.   
 The four basic value foundations of the American Dream are (1) achievement, (2) 
individualism, (3) universalism, and (4) materialism.  Individual self-worth is often evaluated 
on the basis of achievement.  American society emphasizes individualism, as Americans are 
deeply dedicated to individual autonomy and individual rights.  Universalism is described as 
the universal acceptance of cultural goals and values, as virtually everyone is socialized to 
achieve and to evaluate themselves and others using this criteria for success.  Materialism is 
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a focus on monetary success and material accumulation.  All of these factors function in a 
way that emphasizes material gain while diminishing the importance of legitimate means to 
attain economic success. 
 The social structure described by Messner and Rosenfeld‟s theory is characterized by 
an institutional imbalance of power.  This uneven distribution of power results in weakened 
control and support of noneconomic institutions.  The four institutions discussed include the 
(1) economy, (2) family, (3) educational system, and (4) political system.  The economy is 
the dominant institution that impacts the remaining three, creating an institutional imbalance 
of power.  Messner and Rosenfeld point out three ways to demonstrate the institutional 
imbalance of power exerted by the economy onto family, education, and politics.  These are 
(1) devaluation, (2) accommodation, and (3) penetration (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007, p. 76).  
For example, education is devalued by the economy because it is mostly viewed as a way to 
attain a desired occupation, and therefore money.  The domination of family life by work 
schedules, monetary rewards, and punishments is an example of accommodation to the 
economy.  Accommodation occurs when work schedules, rewards, and penalties dominate 
family routines and way of life.  Penetration occurs when families, schools, and political 
activities are performed in a business-like way.  The American Dream functions to produce 
and maintain this institutional imbalance by emphasizing achievement, competition and 
individualism, universalism, and the exaggeration of economic success.   
 These cultural values, the devaluation of noneconomic institutions, and the portrayal 
of economic institutions and economic success of upmost importance can contribute to the 
commission of both street and elite crimes.  In the context of corporations, seeking the 
American Dream, and the values associated with it, can motivate individuals to increase their 
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gains at any costs necessary.  The desire for success continues as individuals advance within 
an organization.  They may become more focused on future progress and increasing their 
own personal gains, while working towards goals and directives put forth by the corporation.  
Cultural prioritization of financial success creates the desire and pressure to maximize 
individual income and corporate profit. 
Contextual Anomie/Strain Theory 
 Institutional Anomie Theory is certainly better-equipped to explain acts of elite 
deviance than Self-Control Theory or General Strain Theory.  However, Robinson and 
Murphy‟s (2009) Contextual Anomie/Strain Theory is even more relevant to understanding 
crimes of the elite.  Based on Insitutional Anomie and Strain theories, they analyze corporate 
wrongdoing by adding the concept of maximization.  Maximization is defined as “the 
concomitant utilization of legitimate and illegitimate means to achieve the goals associated 
with the American Dream” (Robinson & Murphy, 2009, p. 3).  This form of behavior 
involves simultaneously obeying the law and violating the law.  The authors provide an 
example in which the board of directors of a corporation (a legal activity) decides to overlook 
workplace safety regulations (an illegal activity) in order to increase their profits.   
 Maximization is the combination of two adaptive modes to strain:  conformity and 
innovation (see Merton, 1957).  Conformity is defined as the acceptance of cultural goals and 
institutional means, which are consistent with law-abiding behavior.  Innovation is defined as 
the acceptance of cultural goals and rejection of institutional means, which results in criminal 
behavior.  Maximizers simultaneously engage in both conformity and innovation, such that 
the boundaries between law-abiding behaviors and criminal behaviors become distorted or 
disregarded.  This is especially likely to occur in corporate settings where there is added 
pressure to achieve financial success and immoral, harmful legitimate and illegitimate means 
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are normalized.  Maximizers view their actions as justifiable and even celebrated in relation 
to competition within and between businesses.  Examples of maximization include fraud, 
deceptive advertising, the manufacturing of defective products, and even the manufacturing 
of deadly products such as tobacco and automobiles.  Robinson and Murphy (2009) argue 
that crime and deviance have become normal in corporations, and that maximization is the 
primary way corporations have achieved greater wealth. 
Social Learning Theory 
 Social Learning Theory can be traced back to the work of scholars such as Gabriel 
Tarde, Edwin Sutherland, and Albert Bandura (Robinson & Beaver, 2009).  Tarde‟s (1968) 
Theory of Imitation proposed that behavior is learned by mimicking others.  Bandura‟s 
(1973, 1977) observational learning theory proposed that behavior is learned through 
observation and modeling.  An observed behavior is likely to be repeated by an individual if 
it yields positive rewards and reinforcements, especially if the observed behavior is 
performed by an admired superior.  Sutherland‟s (1947) Differential Association Theory 
proposed that criminal behavior is learned from deviant peers.  In the context of a specific 
subculture, criminal behavior may even be valued, especially when individuals associated 
with the subculture adopt values and beliefs that deviate from those of mainstream society.  
In other words, behavior is not formally taught but is rather learned through the replication of 
informal social processes and social interactions.   
 Organizations have their own unique subcultures that shape their individual members‟ 
behavior in several ways, often without their conscious awareness (Coleman, 2006).  
Organizations exercise a great deal of control over human behavior and must indirectly 
influence the lives of groups outside of the organization, while maintaining direct control 
over employees, to survive.  According to Coleman (2006), there are several mechanisms 
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that organizations use to achieve conformity, including the threat of dismissal, the fear of 
losing an important assignment, and not being competitive for promotions.  Organizations 
pressure workers to commit deviant acts using motivations such as alienation (Simon & 
Hagan, 1999).  Pressure to conform often causes personal ethics to be sacrificed for the sake 
of one‟s career.  Over time organizations have become more routine and bureaucratic, 
employing members that were less autonomous and ambitious and more passive and 
malleable (Coleman, 2006).   The organizational subculture defines work situations and 
roles, and shapes the moral sensibilities and attitudes of its members.  Simon and Hagan 
(1999) argue that role confusion can occur when workers confuse the roles they play within 
organizations with who they are as individuals.   
 Management sets standards for ethical behavior for the employees they oversee.  
Individual employees are viewed as dispensable and easily replaceable if they do not 
conform to corporate expectations (Coleman, 2006).  Lower level workers are compelled to 
meet the demands of their superiors (Coleman, 2006; Rossoff, Pontell, & Tillman, 2007).  
Greedy corporate leaders promote deviance within their organizations (Rossoff, Pontell, & 
Tillman, 2007).  In addition, the corporate environment of strain and competition creates 
conditions conducive to crime (Rossoff, Pontell, & Tillman, 2007). 
 The process of socialization occurs at all levels of the organization (Coleman, 2006).  
Corporations shape aspiring employees to fit their corporate image. Transfer is one method 
used by corporations to accomplish this.  Continually shifting employees from one area to 
another and requiring them to work long hours causes their outside ties to become weaker.  
Relationships with family, friends, and community are disrupted and the individual becomes 
more dependent on the organization to satisfy social needs.  This process of socialization can 
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create a sense of amorality and moral numbness, such that those who are well-socialized into 
organizational practices take a narrow pragmatic approach to work, placing the interests of 
their corporation as top priority with little consideration of moral consequences (Coleman, 
2006).  Organizations also define work situations and work-related goals in a way that can 
make amoral and/or illegal acts appear normal and routine.  Because employees are sheltered 
and isolated from the outside world, offenders are insulated from any outside judgment and 
condemnation (Coleman, 2006).  Workers often suffer from self-estrangement and being cut 
off from their own feelings, desires, and needs (Simon & Hagan, 1999).   
 The culture of competition within the subculture of organizations also creates 
criminogenic conditions in which illegal and amoral acts are incorporated into organizational 
norms.  The competitive struggle for personal gain and advancement is viewed as a positive 
individual strength rather than as negative or selfish.  Any social inequality is viewed as 
legitimate and fair.  The poor are stigmatized and labeled incompetent and lazy, while the 
rich and successful are admired, creating a strong desire for success and a fear of failure 
(Coleman, 2006).   
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CHAPTER 3: 
 
PSYCHOPATHY 
 
 
 Psychopathy is fascinating because it is a form of antisocial behavior disguised by a 
veil of normalcy (Patrick, 2006).  Indeed, psychopaths are so proficient in their conning and 
manipulative qualities that they can easily gain the trust of those who surround them.  
Seemingly impervious to the common plights of other psychological disturbances, 
psychopaths are generally well-liked by others and perceived as well-meaning (Patrick, 
2006).   
 The term “psychopathic personality” was first introduced during the late 1800s, and 
by the 1930s the term “sociopathic personality” had emerged (Lykken, 2006).  During the 
1940s, the work of Cleckley (1941) formed the foundation for the pathological condition we 
now know as psychopathy.  His work identified several criteria including superficial charm, 
lack of anxiety, lack of guilt, undependability, dishonesty, egocentricity, failure to learn from 
punishment, poverty of emotions, and lack of insight into the impact of one‟s behavior on 
others (Shipley & Arrigo, 2004; Blair, Mitchell, & Blair, 2005).   
 A clinical diagnosis relevant to psychopathy was subjective until the American 
Psychiatric Association delineated the diagnostic criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder 
(APD or ASPD) in the DSM-III, published in 1980 (Lykken, 2006).  However, it is important 
to distinguish between ASPD and psychopathy.  While ASPD and psychopathy are related 
and share some overlap, they are not the same diagnosis (Shipley & Arrigo, 2004; Hare & 
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Neumann, 2006).  The most recent version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, the DSM-IV-TR, describes the diagnostic criteria for ASPD as follows: 
A.  There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others, 
occurring since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the following: 
(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as 
indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest 
(2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others 
for personal profit or pleasure 
(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead 
(4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or 
assaults 
(5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others 
(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain 
consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations 
(7) lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having 
hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another 
B.  The individual is at least age 18 years. 
C. There is evidence of Conduct Disorder with onset before age 15 years. 
D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of 
Schizophrenia or a Manic Episode (American Psychiatric Association, 2000,  
p. 706 ). 
 
 The current standard for a diagnosis of psychopathy is Robert Hare‟s (2003) 
Psychopathy Checklist—Revised (PCL-R) (Fowles & Dindo, 2006; Walsh, Swogger, & 
Kosson, 2009).  The PCL-R is a construct rating scale that consists of 20 items, each of 
which are scored on a three point scale that ranges from 0 to 2 (Fowles & Dindo, 2006; 
DeMatteo, Edens, & Hart, 2010).  A score of 30 or higher is typically regarded as the 
threshold for psychopathy (Hare, 2003; Hare & Neumann, 2006).  The items have been 
classified into four factors, including interpersonal, affective, lifestyle, and antisocial (Hare 
& Neumann, 2006).  Referring to ASPD, the APA (2000, p. 702) states that, “This pattern 
has also been referred to as psychopathy, sociopathy, or dyssocial personality disorder.” 
However, Hare & Neumann (2006) argue that ASPD and psychopathy represent two related, 
but different constructs.  While those who score high on the PCL-R are likely to meet the 
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diagnostic criteria for ASPD, those with ASPD often do not have high PCL-R scores (Hare & 
Neumann, 2006). Not all criminals can be classified as psychopathic and the level of violence 
seems to be positively correlated with psychopathy (Shipley & Arrigo, 2004.)  According to 
Shipley & Arrigo (2004, p. 44), “Whereas the vast majority (about 90%) of criminals 
classified by the PCL-R as psychopathic are diagnosed with ASPD, only about 30 percent of 
those with the diagnosis of ASPD can qualify as psychopathic.”  Here it is important to note 
that while ASPD and psychopathy may share some similarities, for the purposes of this thesis 
I focus specifically on those character traits associated with psychopathy, rather than with 
ASPD.   
 As illustrated in Table 1 (p. 88), the PCL-R four-factor model of psychopathy 
identifies several personality characteristics.  Among these are conning/manipulativeness, 
impression management, pathological lying, lack or remorse of guilt, callousness/lack of 
empathy, stimulation seeking, impulsivity, and criminal versatility.  Personality can be 
defined as “the set of psychological traits and mechanisms within the individual that are 
organized and relatively enduring and that influence his or her interactions with, and 
adaptations to, the intrapsychic, physical, and social environments” (Larson & Buss, 2005, p. 
4).   
 Other personality traits relevant to corporate violence that are not identified by the 
PCL-R are also explored.  Among these are desire for control and openness/intellect. Desire 
for control can be defined as an urge to exercise control over everyday life events (Piquero, 
Exum, & Simpson, 2005).  Openness/intellect, sometimes referred to as culture, imagination, 
or fluid intelligence, is illustrated  by an openness to new experiences, intellectual ability, 
and creativity (Larson & Buss, 2005).    
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Psychopathy and Street Crime 
 The majority of the literature on psychopathy has traditionally focused on violent 
offenses committed at the street level, rather than acts committed by elites.  Psychopathy has 
been linked to both instrumental and reactive aggression (Blair, Mitchell, & Blair, 2005; 
Walsh, Swogger, & Kosson, 2009).  Instrumental aggression occurs when violence is used to 
achieve a desired outcome, while reactive aggression is triggered by some upsetting event.  
Recent studies on psychopathy and violent street level crimes are reviewed below. 
 In their assessment of female predatory homicide, Shipley and Arrigo (2004) explain 
serial murder at the intersection of psychopathy and attachment disorder.  Attachment 
disorder is associated with symptoms such as superficially engaging and charming behavior; 
lack of eye contact;  indiscriminate affection toward strangers; destructive behavior to self, 
others, and material things; low impulse control; poor peer relationships; and inappropriate 
clinginess.  Using the case of Aileen Wuornos, the authors identified behaviors consistent 
with attachment disorder and psychopathic characteristics.  Their analysis included PCL-R 
traits such as grandiose sense of self-worth, proneness to boredom/need for stimulation, 
pathological lying, conning/manipulative, lack of remorse or guilt, shallow affect, 
callous/lack of empathy, parasitic lifestyle, poor behavioral controls, promiscuous sexual 
relationships, early behavioral problems, lack of realistic long term goals, impulsivity, 
irresponsibility, failure to accept responsibility for one‟s own actions, juvenile delinquency, 
and criminal versatility.  Homicide, especially serial homicide, is linked to personality traits 
consistent with psychopathy.   
 Utilizing a series of three case studies, Pardue and Arrigo (2008), explored several 
personality traits relevant to psychopathy.  They conducted a personality analysis of three 
PSYCHOPATHY AND CORPORATE CRIME  30 
 
 
different types of rape offenders (i.e. power, anger, and sadistic rapists),  rating each rapist 
type on a Likert-type scale.  Power rapists are characterized by using minimal physical force 
and their assaults are argued to function as a means of asserting their masculinity.  In 
contrast, anger rapists are characterized by using more force than necessary and their victims 
are often symbolic of someone that has angered them.  Sadistic rapists are characterized by 
using excessive physical violence and serial sexual homicide.  As demonstrated in Table 2 (p. 
89), the authors found that each type rated high on measures of lack of empathy and 
conning/manipulation.  The anger and sadistic types rated high on novelty/sensation seeking, 
while the power type rated low to moderate on novelty/sensation seeking, in comparison.  
The sadistic type rated moderate on narcissism, while the power and anger types rated high 
on narcissism.  On impulsivity, the anger type rated high in comparison to the power and 
sadistic types, who rated low and low/moderate, respectively.  On the trait of 
surgency/extroversion, the power and anger types rated moderate/high and high respectively, 
while in comparison, the sadistic type rated low.  It is important to note that these offenders 
were rated in comparison to one another, rather than to a non-criminal sample.   
 Walsh, Swogger, and Kosson (2009) studied a sample (N=248) of European 
American and African American men, each of which had a history of at least one violent 
offense, who were being housed in a county jail for felony or misdemeanor convictions.  The 
purpose of their study was to explore the relationship between psychopathy and instrumental 
violence.  They assessed PCL-R scores, a scale designed to measure instrumental violence 
known as the Aggressive Incident Coding Sheet (AICS), and IQ scores using the Shipley 
Institute of Living Scale-Revised (SILS-R).  The mean score for the PCL-R was 25.88 
(SD=6.50).  While a score of 30 is necessary for a diagnosis of psychopathy (Hare, 2003; 
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Hare & Neumann, 2006), the mean score was high enough to reasonably demonstrate that 
there is a correlation between psychopathy and violence.  Violent offenses included crimes 
such as robbery, assault, murder, weapons charges, kidnapping, and sexual offenses.  Results 
indicated that PCL-R scores were positively correlated with instrumental violence.  The 
authors argued that grandiosity and manipulativeness were two mechanisms that facilitated 
instrumental violence.  Grandiosity may function to reduce the fear of apprehension, while 
instrumental violence may be used as one of several manipulative tactics. 
 Häkkänen-Nyholm and Hare (2009) explored the relationship between psychopathy 
and postoffense behaviors in a sample (N=546) of Finnish homicide offenders.  PCL-R 
assessments were performed retrospectively by reviewing files from the National Authority 
for Medicolegal Affairs archives.  The mean PCL-R score was 19.3 (SD=9.8) and PCL-R 
scores were significantly higher for male offenders in comparison to female offenders.  Other 
variables included type of charge (either manslaughter or murder), age, gender, psychiatric 
diagnosis, criminal history, number of co-offenders, being under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol during the crime, leaving the scene without informing anyone, and denial of charges.  
Postoffense behavior was known for 89.8% of the entire sample.  Of these, 160 (32.4%) left 
the scene of the crime without informing anyone of the murder.  These offenders generally 
had higher PCL-R scores than those who did not flee the scene.  Fifty-seven (10.4%) of the 
sample denied the charges brought against them during forensic examinations.  These 
offenders also had significantly higher PCL-R scores.  Results also showed that those with 
higher PCL-R scores received reduced sentences and were able to appeal the sentences of 
higher courts successfully.  This demonstrates the ability of psychopaths to continue 
impression management and manipulative behaviors during the course of criminal 
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proceedings, ultimately deceiving the criminal justice system (Häkkänen-Nyholm & Hare, 
2009).   
 Such capabilities are certainly relevant to extending this analysis to the exploration of 
psychopathic corporate crime.  Psychopathic features such as callousness, grandiosity, and 
manipulativeness, are relevant to making persuasive arguments and potentially harmful 
decisions, while features such as impulsivity, irresponsibility, and poor behavioral controls 
are relevant to poor decision making and performance (Babiak, Neumann, & Hare, 2010).  
While the relationship between violent street level offenses and psychopathy has been well 
established in the literature, little research has been conducted on psychopathy and elite 
offenses.  In fact, the present author only discovered one quantitative study that explores 
corporate crime and psychopathy to date.   
Psychopathy and Elite Crime 
 Babiak, Neumann, and Hare (2010) explain that our limited knowledge about 
corporate psychopathy is largely due to the difficulty in obtaining the cooperation of business 
organizations.  They were presented with a unique opportunity to explore psychopathy and 
its correlates in a sample (N=203) of corporate professionals from various companies.  The 
participants were selected by their organizations to participate in management development 
programs.  Measures of successful performance included performance appraisals conducted 
by corporate staff.  For 140 of the participants, 360-degree assessments were available, which 
were evaluations conducted by five to ten anonymous individuals and reflected six broad 
management competency areas:  (1) communication, (2) creativity/innovation, (3) leadership 
(4) management style (5) strategic thinking, and (6) team player.  Psychopathy was measured 
by conducting PCL-R assessments on each individual.  PCL-R scores were then converted to 
PCL:SV (Psychopathy Check List:  Screening Version) equivalents to allow the distribution 
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of psychopathic traits in the corporate sample to be compared with PCL:SV distributions 
obtained in previous studies of community samples.  The PCL:SV is used to screen for 
psychopathy in forensic, psychiatric, and non-clinical settings and takes less time to 
administer that the PCL-R (Ganellen, 2004).   
 Results yielded both a skewed (2.81, SE=0.17) and kurtotic (7.42, SE=0.34) 
distribution of PCL-R scores.  The scores ranged from 0 to 34 (out of a total possible of 40) 
and the mean was 3.64 (SD=7.35).  While 80% of the scores fell between 0 and 3, nine 
participants (4.4%) had a score of at least 25, eight (3.9%) had a score of at least 30, two had 
a score of 33, and one had a score of 34.  In comparison to the community sample (2.67, 
SD=3.50), the corporate sample had a slightly lower mean score (2.17, SD=4.40) for the 
PCL:SV equivalent.  However, the corporate sample had more participants with high scores 
than those in the community sample.   
 PCL-R scores were not significantly related to the level of management held by 
participants.  However, the authors noted that of the nine participants who scored 25 or 
higher, two were vice presidents, two were directors, two were managers or supervisors, and 
one held some other type of managerial position.  Performance appraisals and 360-degree 
assessments indicated that psychopathy was associated with strong communication skills, 
strategic thinking skills, creativity/innovation, poor management style, and not being 
perceived as team oriented.   
According to Bakan (2004), corporations were initially conceived as public 
institutions intended to serve national interests and advance public goods.  They are creations 
of the state, which granted them rights such as legal personhood and limited liability, and are 
viewed as independent persons.  Bakan (2004) also argues that corporations are psychopathic 
PSYCHOPATHY AND CORPORATE CRIME  34 
 
 
and interviewed Dr. Robert Hare, creator of the PCL-R, on the subject.  Hare points out 
several psychopathic qualities of corporations, including irresponsibility, manipulativeness, 
lack of empathy, lack of guilt or remorse, and superficiality.   
Hare explains that corporations are often irresponsible since they attempt to satisfy 
their goals by putting others at risk.  They attempt to manipulate public opinion and display 
grandiosity by their persistence in establishing their position as “number one” and “the best” 
(Bakan, 2004, p. 57).  Lack of concern shown for those that they have harmed and could 
potentially harm demonstrates their lack of empathy.  Lack of guilt or remorse is illustrated 
by the fact that corporations often continue to commit the same violations after being caught 
and paying fines that are often trivial in comparison to their profits.  Hare also argues that 
corporations are superficial in their relations since they attempt to present themselves in a 
positive light to the public, which is not representative of what they are in reality.  Similar to 
the way in which a human psychopath uses manipulation and charm to “mask” themselves as 
normal, corporations present themselves as socially responsible, compassionate, and 
concerned about others.  However, in reality, and as displayed in their behaviors, they are 
not.   
Other Studies Relevant to Personality and Elite Crime 
 While there is a dearth of research on corporate crime and psychopathy, studies on 
white-collar crime, corporate crime, and personality are relevant for the current analysis.  
Alalehto (2003) studied the relationship between economic crime and personality.  Data were 
gathered from interviews conducted with a total of 128 businessmen.  Randomly selected 
informants acted as interviewers.  Interview materials consisted of 62 main questions and 25 
follow-up questions and took approximately 1.5 hours to conduct.  The results did not 
indicate any specific predictor for law-abiding or criminal behavior.  However, individuals 
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who were positive extroverts, disagreeable, or neurotic showed a greater tendency to commit 
economic crimes.   
The positive extrovert was characterized by social competency, talkativeness, 
spontaneity, and sensuality.  While these seem like rather positive or at least unproblematic 
traits, Alalehto (2003) points out that the positive extrovert may also be manipulative, 
egocentric, and dominating.  In comparison, he identified the disagreeable businessman as 
lacking social competency, being grudging and suspicious, and acting with aggressiveness.  
The neurotic was characterized by self-pity, being quickly offended, insecure, self-critical, 
and unbalanced.  Conceit and agreeableness emerged as traits associated with law-abiding 
behaviors.  According to Alalehto (2003), conceited individuals display self-discipline, 
consistency, predictability, inflexibility, and conventionality while agreeable individuals are 
friendly, good-humored, generous, and forgiving.   
 Feeley (2006) explains a variety of personality characteristics that play a role in the 
commission of white-collar crime.  Interpersonal competitiveness is characterized by 
extreme competition in which individuals are incapable of accepting any sort of loss and are 
driven by the desire of defeating their rivals.  Three dominant personality traits include 
positive extroversion, the disagreeable businessman, and neuroticism.  Positive extroversion 
describes individuals who are talkative and  spontaneous.  Such individuals may also be 
manipulative and egocentric.  In combination with low self-control, extroverted individuals 
may be aggressive, uncooperative, and more likely to engage in antisocial behaviors. The 
disagreeable businessman, in comparison, is characterized by bitterness, having 
condescending attitudes towards co-workers, and being easily angered or frustrated at 
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unplanned circumstances and inconsistencies with order, rules, and corporate customs.  The 
neurotic is described as anxious, insecure, sloppy, and low in self-esteem. 
 These traits, combined with the competitive corporate environment easily facilitate 
antisocial behavior.  Feeley (2006) identified competitive organizational structures, lax 
morality, and feelings of wrongness as environmental factors that also lead to white-collar 
offending.  Organizational structures in a capitalist society can create a “culture of 
competition” (p. 205) fueled by money, which is viewed as a standard of success and creates 
pressure toward economic achievement and attaining wealth.  Lax moral standards and 
attitudes toward corporate and white-collar offenses can make it difficult for individuals, 
including offenders and the public, to relate to the harm caused by crimes such as fraud, tax 
evasion, or perjury, and to the harm caused by crimes such as assault, rape, and murder.  
Aggressive business tactics have become more difficult to distinguish from illegal activity 
(Feeley, 2006).  Slack governmental regulation and weak penalties also send a message that 
these sorts of crimes were not considered important problems.   
According to Simon and Hagan (1999), organizational environments often function to 
produce deviant personalities.  Many individuals may disregard moral behavior and strive to 
advance in their organizations at all costs.  Robinson and Murphy (2009) point out that 
psychopathic behaviors are normal in corporate settings and even valued.  Individuals likely 
to engage in white-collar offenses may meet the criteria for attachment disorder and are 
capable of lying and manipulating with ease (Simon & Hagan, 1999).   
 Certainly, the aforementioned personality traits are relevant for applying psychopathy 
to individuals who engage in white-collar and corporate crimes.  There are a number of ways 
in which white-collar and corporate criminal behavior is consistent with PCL-R qualities, 
PSYCHOPATHY AND CORPORATE CRIME  37 
 
 
such as glib/superficiality, grandiose self-worth, pathological lying, and 
conning/manipulativeness.  For example, positive extroverts are often manipulative 
(Alalehto, 2003; Feeley, 2006), consistent with the PCL-R measure of 
conning/manipulativeness.  In addition, positive extroverts are egocentric, enjoy being 
admired by others, and justify their faults (Alalehto, 2003), consistent with glib/superficiality 
and impression management.  Relevant to shallow affect and callousness/lack of empathy, 
the disagreeable businessman is often suspicious, bitter, grudging, and condescending 
(Feeley, 2006; Alalehto, 2003).   
 Nominalist theories of corporate personality view organizations as collections of 
individuals, while realist theories view corporations as primarily responsible for their actions, 
disregarding individual responsibility (Colvin, 1995).  Indeed because white-collar and 
corporate harm is often viewed as the result of the actions of a group of individuals, rather 
than one individual, there is a dispersion of responsibility.  Individuals within organizations 
can easily blame the organization for any wrongdoing (Punch, 2008), consistent with the 
psychopathic characteristic of failure to accept responsibility.   
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CHAPTER 4: 
 
DATA 
 
 
 In order to explore the relationship between corporate crime and psychopathy, 
qualitative data on corporate behavior were gathered from a variety of resources, including 
academic journal articles and books, news sources, and popular media sources.  Using an 
approach similar to a case study, examples of corporate crime are explored across three 
different industries to include the oil, automobile, and financial/banking industries.  These 
industries represent recent, highly publicized incidences of corporate wrongdoing.  Here, the 
behaviors of several different corporations such as British Petroleum (BP), Toyota, and 
Goldman Sachs are discussed.  These examples of corporate wrongdoing are then applied to 
the various psychopathic traits that they demonstrate, including glib/superficiality, 
impression management, grandiose sense of self-worth/narcissism, pathological lying, 
conning/manipulativeness, lack of remorse or guilt, callousness/lack of empathy, failure to 
accept responsibility, stimulation seeking, irresponsibility, parasitic orientation, serious 
criminal behavior, and criminal versatility.  In addition, the relationship between corporate 
psychopathy and the personality traits of desire for control and openness/intellect are 
explored.   
 Although these examples provide adequate evidence to establish a relationship 
between psychopathy and corporate wrongdoing, this analysis is limited.  Due to the 
widespread nature of corporate crime, an indepth review of all violations across various 
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industries is simply not feasible.  There are countless instances of corporate wrongdoing 
(Bakan, 2004; Clinard & Yeager, 2006; Coleman, 2006; Simon, 2006; Hartley, 2008; 
Robinson & Murphy, 2009).  In addition, the application of individual level constructs to 
behaviors committed in the context of organizational settings presents yet another 
shortcoming of this analysis.  According to Fersch (2006), corporations may be evaluated as 
either individuals or entities consisting of individuals. Both individuals and corporations may 
be labeled as psychopathic.  However, many characteristics associated with psychopathy 
such as shallow affect, juvenile delinquency, and revocation of conditional release may be 
difficult to assess in the context of organizations.  Furthermore, some psychopathic traits “are 
quite specific to human affairs and, even if an argument could be made for their translation to 
corporate behavior, assessment of these qualities holds little value” (Fersch, 2006, p. 126). 
The Oil Industry 
 On Tuesday, April 20, 2010, the mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU) Deepwater 
Horizon, which was being leased to British Petroleum, exploded in the Gulf of Mexico.  The 
explosion resulted in 11 deaths and an oil spill initially estimated at 1,000 barrels (42,000 
gallons) each day  (Hyder, 2010a).  By May 1, 2010, BP and government officials estimated 
that 5,000 barrels (210,000 gallons) were leaking into the Gulf of Mexico each day  (Dlouhy 
& Hatcher, 2010).  By the end of June, this estimate increased to 60,000 barrels (1.5-2.5 
million gallons) per day (Hyder, 2010b).   
Not only did the explosion and ensuing oil spill result in the loss of 11 lives, but also 
in extensive environmental damage and economic issues for fishing and tourists industries on 
the Gulf Coast.  By July, the oil had washed ashore in tourist cities and counties along the 
coast and officials estimated that they would lose approximately $1 million in general sales 
and lodging (Brock, 2010).  As early as May 18, 2010, the National Oceanic and 
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Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) reported that the deaths of 162 sea turtles, a dozen 
bottlenose dolphins, and 23 birds were linked to the oil spill (Hyder, 2010a).  In addition to 
concerns about wildlife populations and habitats, there were also rising concerns about the 
impact of the spill on the local seafood industry and protection of the mainland from 
potential tropical storm damage (Hyder, 2010b).  Gulf fisheries in a 45,728 square mile area 
were closed (Hyder, 2010a).   
 Adding to the outrage of the general public and officials, was BP‟s inadequate 
response to the oil spill.  Interior Secretary Ken Salazar insisted that BP should work harder 
and faster in clean up efforts, while Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal expressed concern that 
the company did not have adequate resources to protect the coast, stop the leak, and clean up 
the spill (Dlouhy & Hatcher, 2010).  It was estimated that there would be tens of thousands 
of lawsuits filed against BP in relation to the oil spill.  Meanwhile, BP had expressed interest 
in its own lawsuit against the Anadarko Petroleum Corporation (APC), a 25% co-owner of 
the leased oil well, for failing to pay for any damages related to the spill.  APC responded by 
accusing BP of gross negligence and willful misconduct (Hyder, 2010a).  
 Prior to the 2010 oil spill, BP had been accused of such behaviors related to 
operations in an Alaskan oil field.  In 2002, BP ordered one of their technicians to reactivate 
a well that had been shut down for repairs at the Prudhoe Bay oil field in Alaska.  This was 
done even though engineers at BP were aware that the well still had problems and would 
operate at unusually high pressures.  Reactivation of the well resulted in an explosion that 
was nearly fatal to the technician ordered to reactivate it.  Fifteen percent of his body was 
covered in burns and he suffered a broken leg, and damaged knees and vertebrae (Bakan, 
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2004).  Prior to this explosion, workers at the Prudhoe Bay oil field had complained about 
BP‟s persistent failure to comply with maintenance and safety regulations.   
In 1999, operators accused BP of not being “in compliance with statutory and 
regulatory requirements” in a letter to the company‟s chief executive, John Browne (Bakan, 
2004, p. 81).  An oil spill that occurred the previous year due to a valve leak, which resulted 
in a spill of 1,200 gallons of oil and thousands of cubic feet of damage, was cited in the letter.  
BP ranked this incident at the most serious level in terms of potential employee deaths and 
environmental damage.  Following this leak, a report called for a maintenance program 
which would require that all similar valves be checked and replaced if necessary.  However, 
this very suggestion was made five years prior by the state regulatory agency responsible for 
overseeing the valves.  According to BP operators, none of these recommendations were 
followed and valves continued to leak (Bakan, 2004).   
In 2001, state inspectors found that one-third of the pads at one of the company‟s 
drilling platforms were defective and not in violation of regulatory standards.  In that same 
year, operators in Alaska had contacted BP‟s probation officer to inform her that the oil 
company was not in compliance with a 1999 probation order.  The probation order had been 
implemented following a felony conviction due to BP‟s negligence in reporting the release of 
a hazardous substance into the environment that had occurred over a two-year period.  For 
this, BP had been fined the maximum penalty of $500,000 and placed on organizational 
probation (Bakan, 2004). 
BP was subjected to a federal investigation concerning changes that were made to a 
2002 report conducted by Alaska state officials.  The company was criticized by U.S. and 
state officials for its response addressing corrosion and potential leak issues with pipelines at 
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the Prudhoe Bay oil field.  Changes were made to the report after BP complained that it was 
too biased and negative, claiming that their review and input on the report was typical of the 
review process.  Coffman Engineers, who wrote the report, claimed to have made changes to 
it after the company further explained some things of which they were unaware.  BP officials 
admitted that they needed to do more in light of the recent discovery of severe corrosion, 
although they defended their corrosion-control programs (Carlton, 2006). 
Another massive BP explosion occurred in March 2005 at a refinery in Texas City, 
Texas resulting in 15 workers being killed and 170 others suffering from injuries.  
Investigators discovered that BP had ignored company protocols and that a warning system 
had been disabled.  The company was fined $50 million by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (Lustgarten, 2010).  Over the past decade, several internal investigations found that 
BP repeatedly disregarded safety and environmental policies and senior level managers were 
warned that serious accidents could occur if their practices did not change.  Risks included 
actions such as neglecting key equipment necessary for emergency shut down such as safety 
valves and gas/fire detectors and falsified inspections of fuel tanks (Lustgarten & Knutson, 
2010).  In 2004, an investigation found workers who raised concern over safety and 
environmental issues were intimidated by management.  The company was said to use the 
practice of “run to failure,” in which equipment is used as long as possible to save on 
maintenance costs  (Lustgarten & Knutson, 2010).    
The Automobile Industry 
 While profit maximization is a top priority for car manufacturers, ensuring consumer 
safety requires special ethical responsibilities (“Toyota in Reverse,” 2010).  In November 
2009, Toyota Motor Corporation issued a recall of 4.2 million vehicles to repair a flaw in 
design that could result in the gas pedal becoming trapped under the floor mat.  A second 
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recall was issued in January 2010 for 2.3 million cars and trucks as a result of a problem with 
accelerator pedals that could stick, causing unintentional acceleration  (Bunkley, 2010).  By 
February 2010, the total number of vehicles recalled climbed to 11 million and Toyota 
announced that it may recall even more vehicles due to power steering defects.   
A Cincinnati attorney filed a class action against Toyota for attempting to conceal the 
accelerator, braking, and steering defects from its customers for almost an entire decade 
(Chesley, 2010).  According to Congressman Bart Stupak, Toyota had attempted to prevent 
Congressional investigators from examining its electronic controls and that, in as early as 
2002, the company had become aware of acceleration issues.  Toyota was also examining 
acceleration problems in Camrys as early as 2004 (“Toyota in Reverse,” 2010).  In addition 
to numerous injuries and billions in economic damage to customers, at least 39 deaths 
occurred due to the defects (Chesley, 2010).  A March 2010 editorial in America magazine 
estimated the total death count due to acceleration problems to be 52 (“Toyota in Reverse,” 
2010).   
  While Toyota had previously denied that there were any flaws in the electronic 
throttle control system design, a representative from Toyota testified before Congress in 
February 2010, admitting that recent recalls related to gas pedals becoming lodged beneath 
floor mats were responsible for 30% of complaints related to unwanted acceleration.  In 
recent years, when Toyota Motor Corporation took steps to hire two top-level bureaucrats 
from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to mediate its relations 
with an overseeing federal agency, it was more than likely focused on cost-savings related to 
automobile recalls, rather than manufacturing ethical products (“Toyota in Reverse,” 2010).  
In addition, it was alleged that several investigations focused on unintended acceleration 
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were reduced or avoided after Toyota hired former regulators from the NHTSA.  Top Toyota 
executives blame the recent recall problems on rapid expansion, which has become a priority 
over quality control (“Toyota in Reverse,” 2010).  Obviously, the damage and loss of life due 
to break, acceleration, and steering defects could have been addressed earlier or all together 
avoided.   
 Toyota has been both praised and criticized for its response to the recall crisis.  The 
president of Toyota Motor Corporation, Akio Toyoda, finally offered a public apology on 
February 5, 2010 but shed no insight into the company‟s plans to assure the safety of their 
automobiles.  Mr. Toyoda did say that the car manufacturer “will cooperate sincerely and 
wholeheartedly” to resolve their safety problems (Shirouzu & Takahashi, 2010, p. B1).  Ray 
LaHood, secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation said that the department may 
file civil claims against the corporation for its delayed response to safety issues  (Shirouzu & 
Takahashi, 2010).  In Canada, Toyota Canada Chief Executive, Yoici Tomihara revealed that 
the company failed to communicate recall facts to the public effectively  (Cameron & 
Watson, 2010).   
 Toyota is not the only automobile manufacturer to cut corners in order to save costs.  
Following a 1993 accident involving a 1979 Chevrolet Malibu, a jury found that General 
Motors had installed fuel tanks in a dangerous fashion in efforts to save costs.  Los Angeles 
Superior Court Judge Ernest Williams ruled that the company was in violation of the law and 
had risked the safety of the public in order to maximize profits, (Bakan, 2004).  While a 
directive issued in 1969 had recommended that fuel tanks be placed at least 17 inches from 
the rear bumper, the tank in the 1979 model Malibu was positioned only 11 inches from the 
rear bumper.   
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Prior to this trial, six suits related to fuel explosions had been filed in the late 1960s 
and 25 were filed in the early 1970s.  Indeed, General Motors was aware of fuel tank related 
explosions and fire risks, but still designed vehicles in which fuel tanks were placed too 
closely to the rear bumper.  These designs were absent of any metal bracing to separate the 
fuel tank from the rear of the car—a feature that had been standard for previous models.  A 
1973 report titled “Value Analysis of Auto Fed Fuel Fire Related Fatalities” written by 
Edward Ivey of GM‟s Advance Design Department, estimated that the company caused 
approximately 500 fatalities due to fuel tank problems (Bakan, 2004).  Using the following 
calculation  (Bakan, 2004, p. 63), Ivey concluded that GM paid $2.40 per vehicle for each 
fuel-fed fatality: 
500 fatalities x $200,000/fatality = $2.40/automobile 
      41,000,000 automobiles 
 
The cost of ensuring that explosions related to fuel tanks did not occur in automobile crashes 
was estimated to be $8.59 per vehicle.  This means that rather than altering the design of their 
vehicles, GM opted to save $6.19 ($8.59 - $2.40 = $6.19) for each automobile that had 
dangerously positioned fuel tanks.  This cost-benefit calculation was reflected in the report 
by Ivey, who was hired internally by the company to analyze fuel-related fatalities (Bakan, 
2004).   
 The Ford Pinto and Explorer are also prime examples of defective automobiles 
(Robinson & Murphy, 2009).  Although crash tests revealed that rear-end collisions were 
likely to result in ruptured fuel lines, the Ford Pinto was manufactured and sold during the 
1970s.  According to “SafetyXchange” (2008), Ford used the following cost-benefit 
calculations: 
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 Benefits: 
 Savings: 180 burn deaths, 180 serious burn injuries, 2100 burned vehicles 
 Unit Cost: $200,000 per death, $67,000 per injury, $700 per vehicle 
 Total Benefit: [(180 x $200,000) + (180 x $67,000) + (2,100 x $700)] = $49.5 million 
  
 Costs: 
 Sales: 11 million cars, 1.5 million light trucks 
 Unit Cost: $11 per care, $11 per truck 
 Total Cost: [(11,000,000 x $11) + (1,500,000 x $11)] = $137 million 
 
Costs-benefit analysis that included the estimated number of fatalities and injuries, concluded 
that fixing the problem would costs $11 per vehicle, while not doing so would save the 
company $87.5 million ($137 million - $49.5 million = $87.5 million). 
 Ford Explorers equipped with Firestone tires also resulted in many deaths and injuries 
due to the tires rupturing and causing the SUVs to flip.  Even though Ford had recalled 
vehicles in over a dozen countries a year earlier, it was slow to respond to recalls in the U.S.  
Although required by federal law, Ford also failed to notify the NHTSA about the defects in 
Firestone tires.  The CEOs of both companies blamed each other for the problems (Robinson 
& Murphy, 2009).  Experts estimated that at least 250 deaths and at least 3,000 injuries 
occurred as a result of the defective tires  (“Firestone Tire Recall Legal Center,” 2008).  Most 
of the deaths resulted from blown out tires that caused the Explorers to rollover.  According 
to data obtained by Ford, three different models of Firestone tires (15‟‟ ATX, ATX II, and 
Wilderness AT tires) had the highest failure rates because of tread peeling off.  Bridgestone 
executives argued that there was no evidence of failure in their tires and that most of the 
accidents, which occurred in southern states, were likely to be caused by a combination of 
driving in high temperatures at high speeds under the recommended tire pressure (“Firestone 
Tire Recall Legal Center,” 2008).  However, Ford executives pointed out that during 1995-
1997 an estimated 500,000 Goodyear tires on their Explorers functioned properly without 
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any evidence of defects or failure.  Adding to the controversy, documents obtained by 
Congressional investigators indicated that Ford may have had knowledge that the Firestone 
tires used on the Explorer at their recommended tire pressures had a low safety margin while 
driving at top speeds  (“Firestone Tire Recall Legal Center”, 2008).  Ford officials 
maintained that tire pressure was not an issue on their Explorers equipped with Goodyear 
tires.   
The Financial Industry 
 There are numerous ways in which financial institutions can increase their capital, 
both legitimately and illegitimately.  While they may face strict penalties, such as the loss of 
licenses and large fines for crimes like money laundering, the U.S. Treasury Department 
claims that the United States is the top money laundering center in the world  (Shelly, 1998).  
According to Shelly (1998), the shift towards globalization has brought an increase in 
transnational crime and corruption and therefore, costly economic crimes deserve more 
attention than traditional forms of violent crime that currently direct most state law 
enforcement resources.  Technology has only generated more avenues for banks and criminal 
groups to take advantage of weak regulations in the international monetary system to move 
illicit capital.  Also suspicious is the use of derivatives by banks, predatory and 
discriminatory lending practices, and the role that big banks play in the federal government.  
In fact, it seems that multinational financial institutions may exercise more power than the 
governments that should be regulating them (Shelly, 1998; Taibbi, 2009).  Shelly (1998) 
describes the role of technology in financial crimes and the control exercised by 
corporations:   
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Most importantly, multinational corporations, not governments, exercise control over 
access to communication technology, which is developed and controlled as part of the 
commercial and business cycle.  The competitive environment in the high-technology 
area makes it difficult to forge coalitions in the computer and telecommunications 
sector, let alone for such bodies to cooperate with law enforcement.  But such 
cooperation must exist if corporations are to avert the harm that may be caused by the 
misuse of the technology they market (p. 618).   
 
 The role that banks have played in government in recent years is certainly 
questionable.  Following one of the worst economic meltdowns in U.S. history which 
occurred in 2008, the very people who caused the crisis in the first place were appointed to 
key economic positions in the White House.  Michael Froman, a high-ranking executive at 
Citigroup who was picked to help choose Obama‟s economic advisers, did not resign from 
Citigroup until two months after he had began working in the White House.  To assist in the 
process of appointing Obama‟s economic advisers, he enlisted the help of former Clinton 
diplomat, Jamie Rubin.  Jamie Rubin is the son of Bob Rubin, who was earning 
approximately $15 million a year at Citigroup, even in the midst of a financial meltdown.  
Bob Rubin‟s persuasion of Citigroup to invest in risky business practices, such as 
collateralized debt obligations (CDO‟s) backed by mortgages, helped lead to the collapse 
(Taibbi, 2009).  CDO‟s involve sophisticated securitization techniques and are usually 
managed by a collateral manager (Forrester, 2002).  According to Boothe (2010) CDO‟s and 
credit default swaps (CDS‟s) are still being used as tools of deception on Wall Street.  He 
defined the two as follows: 
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A credit default swap (CDS) is a swap contract in which the protection buyer of the 
CDS makes a series of payments to the protection seller and, in exchange, receives a 
payoff if a credit instrument (typically a bond or loan) goes into default. 
 
Collateralized debt obligations (CDO‟s) are a type of structured asset-backed security 
(ABS) whose value and payments are derived from a portfolio of fixed income 
underlying assets.  CDO‟s securities are split into different risk classes, or tranches, 
whereby “senior” tranches are considered the safest securities.  Interest and principal 
payments are made in order of seniority, so that junior tranches offer high coupon 
payments (and interest rates) or lower prices to compensate for additional default 
risks (Boothe, 2010).   
 
 In addition, Bush‟s Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, also a former executive of 
Goldman Sachs, and President of the Federal Reserve of New York Timothy Geithner, who 
had also worked with Bob Rubin during the Clinton Administration, assisted in addressing 
the financial crisis.  The final solution was a tax-payer funded government bailout that 
awarded Citigroup twenty billion dollars, in addition to twenty five billion awarded weeks 
before by the Troubled Assets Relief Program, and up to two hundred seventy seven billion 
in tax dollars to cover lost Citi assets, such as the risky CDO‟s that Bob Rubin had persuaded 
the bank to invest in (Taibbi, 2009).  Following the bailout, Timothy Geithner was appointed 
as Obama‟s Treasury Secretary and Froman received an annual bonus of $2.25 million.  
Certainly these actions demonstrate the political power held by key players on Wall Street, 
who have successfully institutionalized the tax payer‟s role as provider for the financial 
industry.   
 According to a U.S. Senate report, mortgage traders at Goldman Sachs attempted to 
manipulate the prices of derivatives associated with subprime home loans for their own 
benefit (Harper & Gallu, 2011).  A derivative can be defined as follows:  
  
 
 
PSYCHOPATHY AND CORPORATE CRIME  50 
 
 
 A security whose price is dependent upon one or more underlying assets.  The 
 derivative itself is merely a contract between two or more parties.  Its value is 
 determined by fluctuations in the underlying assets.  The most common underlying 
 assets include stocks, bonds, commodities, currencies, interest rates, and market 
 indexes.  Most derivatives are characterized by high leverage (“Investopedia”, 
 2011). 
 
Mortgage traders at Goldman Sachs made efforts to put artificially low prices on derivatives 
that would increase in value as mortgage securities decreased, driving owners of credit 
default swaps to sell while enabling traders at Goldman Sachs to buy them at reduced costs 
(Harper & Gallu, 2011).   
 Evrensel (2009) investigated cross-country differences in bank regulations and the 
role of corruption in political-system-related variables that predicted the characteristics of 
bank regulations.  Survey data collected during a prior study (see Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 
2006) were used to examine regulation-related variables in a large sample of countries 
(n=76), representing the first example of a comprehensive collection of global bank 
regulations.  Data obtained from Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine (2006) were also used in 
the analysis.  Twelve categories were organized into survey questions, including entry, 
ownership, capital, activities, external auditing requirements, internal management and 
organization, liquidity and diversification requirements, depositor protection, provisioning 
requirements, accounting and information disclosure requirements, discipline/problem 
institutions/exit, and supervision.   
 Results indicated that developing countries have stricter banking regulations in 
regards to auditing requirements, various capital-related ratios, reserves, and the type of 
mandatory actions taken in case of regulation violations than more developed countries.   
Developing countries were also more likely to reduce competition among banks, provide 
greater safety nets, and withhold information from the public.  When corruption control was 
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used as a proxy for executive constraints, results revealed that less corruption was related to 
lower denied entries and banking restrictions and more constrained deposit insurance 
schemes.  Also, countries geographically located in lower latitudes and with fewer years of 
independence were inclined to have weaker executive constraints and more corruption.  The 
author concluded that bank regulations reflect political systems, rather than ignorance of 
effective banking regulations and therefore, ineffective government policies may be 
implemented deliberately. 
 In explaining the forces behind the recent mortgage credit crisis, one argument 
presented by Johnston (2009) was that greedy lenders, deceptive loan originators, creators of 
mortgage-blocked securities, and complacent investors were to blame for mortgage 
problems.  Subprime  lenders target low-income borrowers, the elderly, and minorities.  
Borrowers are often financially unsophisticated and easily led.  Lenders provide 
misinformation, manipulate borrowers with aggressive sale tactics, and prey on their lack of 
understanding of loan stipulations and consequences.  There are several ways that subprime 
borrowers are exploited by predatory lenders, such as using adjustable rates, lack of income, 
broker incentives, negative amortization, prepayment penalties, and excessive fees (Johnston, 
2009).  First, lenders may initially give borrowers a low, adjustable rate and increase the rate 
over time.  Second, they may also adjust rates without considering the income of the 
borrower and if they can realistically repay the loan.  Third, using broker incentives based on 
the “yield spread premium,” lenders lock borrowers into interest rates much higher than the 
best rate available.  Fourth, negative amortization occurs when loan required load payments 
are lower than the interest, causing the principal or balance due to increase.  Next, 
prepayment penalties penalize borrowers for prepaying on a loan that they plan to refinance.  
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Finally, excessive fees include fees such as loan origination fees, transaction fees, brokerage 
fees, settlement fees, and closing costs. 
 Aggressive lenders also often sway creditworthy borrowers eligible for safer, less 
expensive prime loans into accepting profitable, risky subprime loans.  Lenders, such as 
Ameriquest Mortage Company, may also commit fraud by forging income tax returns, 
retirement investment information, and employment verifications.  The government also 
failed to protect borrowers and encouraged loose lending practices (Johnston, 2009). 
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CHAPTER 5: 
 
APPLICATION 
 
 
According to Fersch (2006), corporations can be assessed as both individuals and 
entities consisting of individuals.  Both may potentially be identified as psychopathic.  
However, some psychopathic characteristics such as shallow affect, juvenile delinquency, 
and revocation of conditional release are very specific to the individual and hold little value 
in evaluations of corporations (Fersch, 2006).  Certainly, without a quantifiable sample of 
corporate individuals, it may not be possible to evaluate the presence or absence of some 
psychopathic traits.   
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the actions of the corporations described in this 
analysis, which demonstrate psychopathic characteristics, are discussed in this chapter. The 
traits for which corresponding psychopathic behaviors were revealed include 
glib/superficiality, impression management, grandiose sense of self-worth/narcissism, 
pathological lying, conning/manipulativeness, lack of remorse or guilt, callousness/lack of 
empathy, failure to accept responsibility, stimulation seeking, irresponsibility, parasitic 
orientation, serious criminal behavior, and criminal versatility.  In addition, the desire for 
control and openness/intellect emerged as noteworthy personality traits for corporate 
offending.  However, there was not enough evidence to support the following traits: shallow 
affect, impulsivity, lack of realistic goals, poor behavioral controls, poor anger control, early 
behavior problems, juvenile delinquency, revocation of conditional release, and violation of 
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conditional release.  It is also important to note that this analysis is not intended to label 
everyone affiliated with a certain organization as psychopathic.  Rather, the aim is to identify 
ways in which the actions of corporations illustrate behaviors consistent with the construct of 
psychopathy.   
PCL-R Traits Examined 
Glib/Superficial 
 Glib and superficiality are characterized by efforts to mask or hide what is occurring 
in reality beneath the surface (Feeley, 2006).  Corporations benefit from masking their inner 
workings from the public or others that may be harmed by their deeds, such as shareholders 
and investors (Feeley, 2006; Robinson & Murphy, 2009).  According to Feeley (2006), 
corporations that contributed to the Enron scandal behaved publicly in a way that was very 
different from the way they behaved in reality.  Indeed, corporations may behave in a 
superficial manner when dealing with the public and other entities.  Consider even how some 
logos and slogans are designed to “attract” consumers, while hiding the inner workings of an 
organization.  For instance, in 2000 BP attempted to portray the company as environmentally 
friendly by launching a two hundred million dollar public relations campaign.  BP‟s logo 
depicting a green and yellow sunburst and their “Beyond Petroleum” slogan has been 
described as ludicrous (Landman, 2010).  The company spent $45 million to buy Solarex, a 
solar energy company.  However, this pales in comparison to the $26.5  billion that BP spent 
to buy ARCO (Atlantic Richfield Company) to expand their oil drilling operations 
(Landman, 2010).   
 Ford Motor Company also spent millions of dollars on their ad campaign, “Quality is 
job one.”  However, the company continues to manufacture and sell poor quality vehicles.  
Following the launch of their campaign, Ford faced California courts in a trial that could 
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have costs them up to one billion dollars, due to faulty ignition switches on five million 
vehicles.  Ford was warned that the ignition switches may fail because of high temperatures 
and reports revealed that the ignition switches could have been repaired for a price of $4 per 
car (Walczak).   
 Following the 2008 financial crisis, Goldman Sachs planned to launch several public 
relations campaigns in order to portray themselves as a good citizen  and to reconstruct their 
public image (Carney, 2010).  The first campaign highlighted their role in raising funds for a 
clean energy project.  Other ad campaign plans included emphasizing their role in offering 
business education to women and small business owners.  According to Carney (2010), the 
company was attempting to portray themselves as having a positive impact on businesses, 
communities, and the environment while increasing the number of jobs.  These actions 
demonstrate the superficial surface that corporations attempt to use in order to mask their 
faults, misdeeds, and true intentions from the public.  This characteristic shares much overlap 
with other factors associated with psychopathy, such as impression management and 
manipulativeness.   
Impression Management 
 Impression management has been described as the efforts put forth by individuals in 
order to be viewed by others in a socially desirable or favorable manner (Montagliani & 
Giacalone, 1998; Sato & Nihei, 2009).  According to Sato and Nihei (2009), when people are 
motivated to manipulate impressions of themselves, they often use deception.  For example, 
BP repeatedly underestimated the volume of oil spilling into the Gulf of Mexico following 
the April 20, 2010 oil spill.  Perhaps the oil company did not wish for the full extent of 
damages to become known in order to minimize the negativity associated with their failures 
and to protect their public image.  The company further demonstrated tactics of impression 
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management by persuading state officials in Alaska to alter a report conducted in 2002, 
claiming that it was too biased and too negative (Carlton, 2006).  Certainly, these actions 
contradict their launch of the “Beyond Petroleum” campaign (Landman, 2010).   
 A public apology was given by the president of Toyota Motor Corporation following 
recent recalls of at least 11 million vehicles.  However, it is reasonable to suspect that this 
apology was insincere since Toyota had been aware of vehicle malfunctions for some time 
before taking corrective actions and issuing recalls.  Following the 2008 Financial Crisis, 
Goldman Sachs Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Lloyd Blankfein, apologized for the 
company‟s role in the meltdown deeming their actions as “clearly wrong” and regrettable  
(Harper & Townsend, 2009).  He added that the organization was concerned about the 
criticism it had received for having enough money to compensate each employee $527,192 
only one year after gaining taxpayer-funded bailout and he emphasized the importance of the 
company‟s reputation.   
 Also noteworthy is that most sweatshops are located in remote places that are guarded 
and surrounded by barbed wire.  While this is partially a strategy used to maintain control 
over workers, it helps to hide inhumane working conditions from the public.  If the general 
public was aware that companies such as Nike, the Gap, and Walmart sold products that were 
produced in sweatshops, their profits may drop dramatically.   
 Corporations are not concerned with morality and the harm they impose on the 
public.  Instead they are focused on creating and maintaining a socially desirable appearance, 
putting forth an image that portrays them as concerned, caring, and responsible 
organizations.  Maintaining a good reputation and presenting the appearance of virtue, ethics, 
and morality is advantageous for corporations, while actual social responsibility 
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compromises profit maximization (Robinson & Murphy, 2009).  For-profit public relations 
firms and business sponsored policy institutions produce misleading facts, opinion pieces, 
expert analysis, opinion polls, and mail and phone solicitations to generate public advocacy 
and image-building campaigns (Korten, 2001).  According to Korten (2001), a study 
conducted in 1999 found that almost 40% of news content in typical U.S. newspapers is 
derived from press releases, story memos, and recommendations created by public relations 
firms.  In addition, actual news reporters are outnumbered by public relations employees by 
approximately forty thousand.  Public relation firms are hired by corporations to manipulate 
news, public opinion, and public policy (Korten, 2001).   
Grandiose Sense of Self-Worth/Narcissism 
 Grandiosity has been described as central to narcissism, which is characterized by an 
excessive need for admiration, arrogance, sense of entitlement, envy, and exploitative 
tendencies towards others (Brown, Budzek, & Tamborski, 2009).  Narcissism has been 
defined as “inflated self admiration and constant attempts to draw attention to the self and to 
keep others focused on oneself” (Larson & Buss, 2005, p. 322).  Many corporations 
demonstrate an inflated sense of self-worth when they prioritize profit maximization above 
the safety of their own workers and consumers.  BP neglects safe operation practices by 
using equipment until it will no longer work.  Toyota, General Motors, and Ford endangered 
the lives of millions by deliberately manufacturing and selling vehicles they knew had 
hazardous design flaws.  Financial institutions have played a prominent role in government, 
exercising a great deal of political influence and power.  Many other companies manufacture 
defective and deadly products.  Focusing on their own revenues, while devaluing the well 
being and safety of others sends the message that corporations feel entitled to exploit others, 
even in anticipation of negative consequences such as lawsuits and government fines.  
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 Corporations often view themselves as being above the law and worthy enough to 
improve their own lives at the expense of others (Fersch, 2006).  In an interview regarding 
the 2010 BP oil spill, former CEO Tony Hayward said, “We‟re sorry for the massive 
disruption it‟s caused their lives. There‟s no one who wants this over more than I do.  I would 
like my life back” (Johnson, 2010).  In regards to Hayward‟s comments, The Huffington Post 
(“BP CEO Tony Hayward:  „I‟d Like my Life Back,‟ 2010) stated, “After apologizing for the 
disaster, Hayward manages to bring it back to himself.  Hayward's comments are baffling as 
he's not even trying to hide that fact that he's only looking out for Number One.”  Although 
Hayward later apologized for the comment, his behavior demonstrates an inflated sense of 
self-worth and a tendency to attempt to keep others focused on himself.   
Pathological Lying 
 Pathological lying is characterized by a long history of frequent and repeated lying, 
often for no apparent purpose (Dike, 2008).  There are several examples of pathological lying 
among corporations.  BP repeatedly downplayed the significance of the 2010 Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill so much that White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs declared that 
estimates from the oil company were unreliable  (REIS, 2010).  Goldman Sachs sold 
mortgage-backed securities to their clients, concealing the fact that if the securities failed, 
that Goldman Sachs would profit from them  (Spak, 2011).  In addition, CEO Lloyd 
Blankfein was accused of lying under oath when he claimed that his company had not bet 
against the mortgage market for their own benefit.  Toyota Motor Corporation denied that 
there were any defects in accelerator, breaking, and steering systems in their vehicles for 
almost a decade (“Toyota in reverse,” 2010).  Ten years leading up to the Enron collapse, the 
company gained about nine billion dollars by borrowing money from organizations, such as 
JPMorgan Chase and Citigroup, and labeling it as revenue.  Corporations involved in the 
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Enron scandal used secret meetings, document shredding, faulty corporate branches, and 
deceptive financial reporting to deceive the government and undermine potential 
whistleblowers (Fersch, 2006).  Tobacco companies have also lied about the addictiveness of 
their products, even while under oath, to Congress (Robinson & Murphy, 2009). 
Conning/Manipulativeness 
 Manipulativeness is characterized by charm, deceit, risk-taking, and carelessness 
about rules and conventions (Zibarras, Port, & Woods, 2008).  BP engages in tremendous 
risk-taking and carelessness by running equipment in need of replacement or repair until it 
will no longer operate.  A 2004 BP investigation found that management used tactics of 
intimidation against workers who raised concerns over safety and environmental violations.  
Toyota illustrated manipulative qualities by trying to conceal accelerator, braking, and 
steering defects from consumers.  Toyota also hired former regulators from the NHTSA to 
investigate acceleration malfunctions, which resulted in reduced and avoided consequences 
for the automobile maker.   
In the financial industry, banks are able to benefit from the use of technology and 
weak regulations to move illicit capital.  Corporations depend on government regulation to 
stabilize competition, increase demand, and to promote other corporate agendas that they 
cannot fulfill independently (Derber, 2002).  However, they also lobby for loose regulations 
to serve their own interests and are able to influence the law in such ways that it does not 
fully protect the public (Robinson, 2009).   Bob Rubin of Citigroup persuaded the 
organization to invest in risky business practices that lead up to the 2008 financial crisis.  In 
addition, subprime lenders that target low-income borrowers, the elderly, and minorities 
demonstrate qualities of manipulitiveness.  They use aggressive sale tactics and take 
advantage of the lack of understanding surrounding loan stipulations to manipulate 
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borrowers.  Playing a prominent role in the Enron scandal, financial institutions such as 
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Bank America, Barclays Banks, and Deutsche Bank, 
used a manipulative tactic known as prepay to give the appearance that funds borrowed by 
Enron were profits, when in fact it was debt.  In addition, fraud is a manipulative behavior 
that involves deceit, trickery, or lies and is utilized in an assortment of industries and in a 
variety of contexts.  Deceptive advertising is another type of manipulative behavior, in which 
experts are hired to develop ads that are persuasive to sample consumer populations.   
Lack of Remorse or Guilt 
 According to Silfver and Helkama (2007) guilt “refers to the private feelings of a 
troubled conscious caused by a personal wrongdoing or by disadvantaging a valued other” (p. 
239).  Following the March 2005 oil spill in Texas that resulted in 15 deaths and 170 injuries, 
BP continued to operate dangerous equipment, which resulted in another explosion in 2010 at 
a Gulf of Mexico drilling unit leading to another 11 fatalities.  While Toyota was aware of 
vehicle design flaws and potential malfunction-related fatalities, they continued to sell 
dangerous automobiles.  GM decided to save $6.19 per vehicle rather than correct the 
problems with fuel tanks that were carelessly positioned too close to the rear bumper, which 
would have made their vehicles safe and decreased deaths following rear-end crashes. Ford 
continued to sell dangerous vehicles in the U.S., even after issuing recalls in at least a dozen 
other countries.  Financial institutions continue to take advantage of deregulation and engage 
in risky banking practices and sweatshops continue to operate in the United States and 
abroad.  These continuous behaviors indicate that while corporations are aware of the 
negative consequences their actions have on others, they feel no guilt about the harm they 
cause.   
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Callounesss/Lack of Empathy 
 Rogers (1975) defined empathy as understanding another person through his or her 
point of view.  Levenson and Ruef (1992) defined empathy as “the ability to detect 
accurately the emotional information being transmitted by another person” (p. 234).  Many 
behaviors that illustrate a lack of empathy among corporations overlap with their lack of guilt 
or remorse.  Again, the fact that corporations continue to engage in behaviors that are 
harmful demonstrates they have no regard for the negative effects that their actions have on 
others.  BP has repeatedly ignored warnings and risk involved in operating unsafe equipment 
demonstrated a lack of empathy and disregard for workers‟ rights and safety.  Automobile 
manufactures have also cut corners in order to save costs, jeopardizing the lives of innocent 
consumers.  Financial institutions have engaged in behaviors such as risky business practices, 
predatory lending, and fraud, demonstrated an absence of empathy toward clients, 
shareholders, and the public.  Corporations are indifferent to right and wrong, and pleasure 
and pain, with the exception of the corporate counterparts of profit and loss.  While 
individuals who work in corporations have morals and values, social science research 
suggests that these are weakened in the setting of a corporation.  Individual corporate 
employees are expected to discard their own morals and values in exchange for those of the 
corporation (Robinson & Murphy, 2009).   
Failure to Accept Responsibility 
Rather than accepting responsibility for their actions, psychopaths tend to rationalize 
and justify their behavior, often blaming others (Hare, 2003).  Psychopaths are unable to 
internalize feelings of shame, leading to a tendency to react to shame by externalizing blame 
and anger (Campbell & Elison, 2005).  For example, following the April 2010 oil spill, BP 
threatened Anadarko Petroleum Corporation (ACP), a 25% co-owner of the oil well that 
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exploded, with a lawsuit for not paying for any damages related to the spill.  In return, ACP 
accused BP of gross negligence and willful misconduct.  Firestone and Ford blamed each 
other for recalls involving Ford Explorers equipped with Firestone tires that were prone to 
turning over.  Several financial institutions were awarded a government bailout that was 
funded with tax dollars following the 2008 economic crisis.  Each of these instances 
demonstrates ways in which corporations do not accept the problematic consequences that 
result from their own doing.   
Stimulation Seeking 
 Stimulation or sensation seeking has been defined as “the tendency to seek out 
thrilling and exciting activities, to take risks, and to avoid boredom” (Larson & Buss, 2005, 
p. 212).  Profit maximization itself, and the efforts put into achieving increased profits, may 
be thrilling and exciting to the individuals involved.  Many corporations, such as Citigroup, 
engage in risky business practices, including the use of derivatives, credit default swaps, and 
collateralized debt obligations.  In addition, corporations even take risks with human life.  In 
March 2005, there was an explosion at a BP oil refinery in Texas City, Texas, which claimed 
the lives of 15 people and injured another 170 people.  The mobile offshore drilling unit, 
which was being leased to BP, that exploded in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010, 
claimed the lives of 11 people.  The actions of car manufacturers such as Toyota, Ford, and 
General Motors have also claimed the lives of innocent people.   
Irresponsibility 
 Corporations are held accountable only to their shareholders (Fersch, 2006).  Aside 
from this demonstration of responsibility, other behaviors of corporations demonstrate a great 
deal of irresponsibility.  For example, BP ordered an oil well to be reactivated at the Prudhoe 
Bay oil field even though officials were aware that it would operate under excessive 
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pressures.  BP has consistently failed to comply with maintenance and safety regulations.  
Although the Alaskan regulatory agency had suggested a maintenance program be developed 
to check and replace valves as needed, BP ignored such recommendations allowing valves to 
continue to leak.  In the 2005 Texas oil spill, it was discovered that BP had disabled warning 
systems and ignored company protocols.  Their operation philosophy has been described as 
“run to failure,” which is done to save on maintenance costs.  Likewise, automobile makers 
failed to manufacture ethical products putting the public at risk and  financial institutions 
have engaged in risky business practices. 
 Corporations are responsible to their shareholders, but not to the U.S. or its citizens.  
The primary focus of corporations has traditionally been to maximize profits rather than 
social responsibility (Clinard & Yeager, 2006).  Both corporations and their shareholders 
tend to favor corporate profit over social responsibility (Derber, 2002).  The influence of 
shareholders over corporations has increased, while that of workers and communities has 
decreased.  Corporations “are responsible only to the narrow interests of their investors, 
which frequently violate their long-term broader interests in good jobs and healthy 
communities” (Derber, 2002, p. 116).  While shareholders do not have any direct control 
over the everyday corporate operations, corporations recognized shareholder return as a 
primary obligation.   
 There have been rules and regulations designed to keep corporations in check and to 
protect the public since the Industrial Revolution (Hartley, 2008).   However, corporations 
claim that self-regulation, absent of public oversight or enforcement, is the most effective 
way to deal with corporate problems (Korten, 2001).  In other words, corporations are 
allowed to police themselves and little efforts are made to enforce laws that target white-
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collar and corporate violations.  (Robinson & Murphy, 2009).  Regulatory agencies are 
generally understaffed and underfunded.  Further, free market economists argue that 
government regulation thwarts unrestrained competition, which lowers prices and urges 
corporations to manufacture high quality and safe goods and services (Robinson & Murphy, 
2009).  Therefore, the responsibility of consumer protection falls onto the public, rather than 
regulators or corporations themselves, who operate under the notion of caveat emptor, which 
means “let the buyer beware” (Robinson & Murphy, 2009, p. 58). 
Parasitic Orientation 
 Several corporations demonstrate a parasitic orientation by utilizing the help of others 
to commit their offenses.  For example, Toyota hired former regulators from the NHTSA to 
help reduce or altogether avoid investigations aimed at acceleration problems.  Many 
prominent individuals on Wall Street, such as former Goldman Sachs executive Henry 
Paulson and Federal Reserve president Timothy Geithner, have served and are currently 
serving as key financial advisers to the U.S. government.  Banking institutions relied on the 
federal government for a financial bailout, while the federal government allowed top 
executives from those institutions to guide regulations and policies.  According to Derber 
(2002), federal regulators are disproportionately recruited from the very industries they 
regulate.  Regulation plays a contradictory role as both a means of restraint on corporate 
power and support for corporate ascendancy.  While regulation may threaten some corporate 
interests, it can also function to serve corporate interests in many hidden ways.  Regulations 
shield corporations from public accountability and reinforce their image as private 
enterprises, while creating the illusion of public trust (Derber, 2002).  As Robinson and 
Murphy (2009, p. 57) state, “The history of government regulation has been one of 
businesses regulating themselves for their own benefit and gain.”  In addition, technology 
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aids funds to be rapidly transferred to financial centers where controls are limited, enabling 
corporations to deposit large sums of money into offshore bank accounts.  Through offshore 
banking, corporations are able to evade government regulation and allow capital to grow 
without taxation, which also creates a competitive advantage that results in higher profits 
(Shelly, 1998). 
Serious Criminal Behavior 
 One way to gauge the seriousness of criminal behavior is to measure it in terms of 
how much harm is caused.  The actions of corporations result in harm across many domains 
including the wellbeing of the public, the environment, and the economy.  According to 
Robinson and Murphy (2009), corporate and white-collar offenses result in an estimated 
$384 billion dollars more and in 718,308 more deaths than street level offenses in 2005.  In 
just ten years, the actions of BP have resulted in the deaths of at least 26 people.  In addition, 
they have caused extensive environmental and economic damages in areas affected by oil 
spills.  The number of deaths caused by Toyota alone was estimated to be 52 following the 
recent 2010 recalls.  In contrast, the total number of deaths caused by prolific serial killer 
Jeffrey Dahmer is estimated to be 17.  While, the criminal activities of street level offenders 
such a Dahmer should not be viewed with diminished magnitude, the criminal behaviors of 
corporations should be treated with just as much attention.  The Senate‟s Subcomittee on 
Investigations suggested that the Justice Department and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) press charges against Goldman Sachs for misleading clients.  The 
committee also recommended that perjury charges be filed against Blankfein for lying under 
oath  (Spak, 2011).     
 Corporate crimes, regardless of whatever form they may take (i.e. fraud, deceptive 
advertising, inhumane working conditions, manufacturing deadly and/or defective products) 
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are normal in the U.S. (Robinson & Murphy, 2009).  Sutherland (1983) determined that the 
criminality of corporations is persistent and that a large number of corporations are 
recidivists.  Corporate crimes are usually more extensive than prosecutors and complaints 
indicate.  In addition, corporate criminals do not lose their status among their colleagues.  In 
fact, they are often even admired.  In addition, corporate officials generally feel and openly 
express derision toward the law, government, and government officials.  Nor do they think of 
themselves as criminals.   
 In a study of 70 of the largest industrial and commercial corporations, 97.1% were 
found to be recidivists.  Of these, at least 59 had been formally charges with actions such as 
fraud, embezzlement, extortion, or other financial manipulations.  However, Sutherland 
(1983) points out that the 11 remaining corporations had participated in the same practices, 
but were not formally charged.  Furthermore, adding to the normalcy and widespread nature 
of corporate crime, individuals who work in corporations are highly likely to engage in 
deviant and criminal behavior to meet corporate expectations.  This is especially true when 
corporate values become individual employee values.  “The psychopathic behaviors that 
characterize corporate crime are normal” (Robinson & Murphy, 2009, p. 117).   
Criminal Versatility 
 Corporations are able to engage in voluminous criminal offenses across a wide array 
of contexts.  For example, BP repeatedly violates worker safety standards and environmental 
polices.  Automobile manufacturers, such as Toyota and General Motors, have committed a 
wide array of acts included fraud, deceptive advertising, manufacturing defective 
automobiles, marketing and selling them without disclosing details regarding defects.  
Likewise, financial institutions have engaged of a variety or wrongful behaviors included 
fraud, money laundering, predatory and discriminatory lending, and using risking business 
PSYCHOPATHY AND CORPORATE CRIME  67 
 
 
practices such as derivatives, collateralized debt obligations, and credit default swaps.  
General Electric has faced a variety of charges ranging from discrimination against 
employees, improperly testing military aircraft, illegal sale of military jets to a foreign 
country, and soil and water contamination.  Tobacco companies have also engaged in a 
variety of deviant acts including intentionally misleading the public and Congress about the 
risks associated with tobacco use, lying to Congress while under oath, marketing tobacco 
products to children and adolescents, increasing the addictiveness of their products, attacking 
and attempting to discredit whistleblowers and anti-tobacco advocates, financially coercing 
manufacturers of smoking cessation products, and funding their own Tobacco Institute to 
produce erroneous science in order to obscure significant issues (Robinson & Murphy, 2009).   
Other Personality Traits 
Relevant to the Study of Corporate Crime 
Desire for Control 
 Desire for control is characterized by an urge to exercise control over everyday life 
events (Piquero, Exum, & Simpson, 2005).  Individuals high in desire for control are 
typically assertive, decisive, and active.  They tend to seek influence over others for their 
own benefit, avoid failures by manipulating events in a way that warrants preferred 
outcomes, and emerge as leaders in group settings (Burger & Cooper, 1979).  Toyota 
attempted to prohibit Congressional investigators from examining electronic controls related 
to acceleration problems that led up to a massive recall.  BP admitted to photoshopping 
images of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill  (Hough, 2010).  The oil company also 
convinced state official in Alaska to alter a 2002 report (Carlton, 2006).  Key players in 
financial institutions demonstrate a high desire for control in exercising a great deal of 
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influence over the federal government, having enough influence to gain tax-funded bailouts 
and to even serve as economic advisers.   
 The actions of tobacco companies, also illustrate a high desire for control by trying to 
gain power through inclusive lobbying.  Tobacco companies have made large contributions 
to the political campaigns of crucial decision-makers in Washington (Simon, 2006).  
Between 1990-2006, tobacco companies contributed a total of 57.6 million dollars, 29 
million dollars of which was soft money.  Soft money is that which is paid to individual 
political candidates and is a practice that is now prohibited by Congress (Robinson, 2009).  
The remaining $23.2 million was given to Political Action Committees (PAC) money.  PACs 
are groups that are established with the purpose of raising money for political campaigns 
(Robinson, 2009).  In addition, tobacco companies have lied to Congress while under oath, 
and formed their own research institution which was biased in the information they provided 
to the public (Robinson & Murphy, 2009).   
Openness/Intellect 
 Openness/intellect, sometimes referred to as culture, imagination, or fluid 
intelligence, is characterized by an openness to new experiences, intellectual ability, and 
creativity (Larson & Buss, 2005).  Those who hold positions of high esteem in corporations 
are likely to be intellectual capable and creative.  For example, recall from Chapter 2 that 
Andrew Fastow and Jeffrey Skilling of Enron both held Master‟s degrees and Kenneth Lay 
completed a Ph.D.  Tony Hayward, CEO of BP during the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
obtained a Ph.D. in Geology from the University of Edinburgh (Usborne, 2010).  Akio 
Toyoda, president of Toyota Motor Corporation holds a master‟s degree in business 
administration from Babson College (Bloomberg, 2011).  Lloyd Blankfein of Goldman Sachs 
received a J.D. from Harvard Law School  (Investor Portal, 2009).  These achievements 
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demonstrate that those affiliated with corporations and their acts of wrongdoing are highly 
competent and intellectually capable.  A great deal of creativity is also necessary for 
corporations to use both legitimate and illegitimate means to maximize profits and in their 
attempts to evade negative consequences.   
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CHAPTER 6: 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Psychopathy, much like the traditional focus in the criminological literature, has been 
conventionally used to explain violent street level offenses, such as robbery, homicide, and 
sexual assault.  While such crimes certainly warrant academic attention and should not be 
minimized, nor should crimes committed by elite members of society.  Perhaps the nature of 
street and elite crimes explain why the study of white-collar and corporate offenses has been 
neglected.  While street violence is often direct, intentional, causes immediate harm, and 
consists of individual offenders with various motivations; corporate violence is characterized 
by indirect, delayed harm, multiple offenders, financial motivation, and culpability 
(Robinson & Murphy, 2009).   
 Recall from chapter two that current explanations of corporate crime include Self-
Control Theory (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990), General Strain Theory (Agnew, 2006), 
Institutional Anomie Theory (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2007), Contextual Anomie/Strain 
Theory (Robinson & Murphy, 2009), and Social Learning theories (Tarde, 1968; Bandura, 
1973; Bandura, 1977; Sutherland, 1947).  Self-Control Theory only predicts a low rate of 
white-collar and corporate deviance, partly because the ability to successfully secure 
employment and to achieve advancement within an organization entail behavior that is quite 
contradictory to low levels of self-control.  General Strain Theory explains acts of white-
collar and corporate crime based on strains related to financial, goal-related, and economic 
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inequality.  Institutional Anomie Theory explains criminal behavior as a product of the 
American Dream and the institutional imbalance of noneconomic institutions (i.e. family, 
education system, political system) and the economy.  Contextual Anomie/Strain Theory 
explains corporate crime with the concept of maximization, which is the use of both 
legitimate and illegitimate means to increase corporate profit.  Social Learning Theories 
explain corporate and white-collar crime through the observation and modeling of behavior 
in organizational subcultures.   
 The construct of psychopathy adds to existing explanations of corporate and white-
collar crime in several ways.  Features of psychopathy may emerge more strongly when 
compounded my low levels of self-control, financially-related strains, values associated with 
the American Dream, maximization techiniques, and social learning within corporations.  For 
example, the overall cultural prioritization of financial success and pressures to achieve both 
individual economic achievement and corporate financial goals may increase the likelihood 
of behaviors consistent with psychopathy.  Within the context or corporations, the impact of 
social learning regarding the importance of organizational financial success and ever-
increasing profits, and utilization of innovative maximization techniques, help to explain 
reasons that psychopathic behaviors have become normalized and valued among corporate 
employees.  The concept of maximization, as defined by Robinson and Murphy (2009), is a 
prime example of the psychopathic qualities that corporations display by attempts to increase 
profits using both legitimate and illegitimate activities.   
 The current analysis provides substantial evidence for the relationship between 
psychopathy and corporate crime.  Qualitative data on the oil, automobile, and financial 
industries, which were gathered from academic, news, and popular media sources, revealed 
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that corporate behavior corresponds with several psychopathic traits.  These include 
glib/superficiality, impression management, grandiose sense of self-worth/narcissism, 
pathological lying, conning/manipulativeness, lack of remorse or guilt, callousness/lack of 
empathy, failure to accept responsibility, stimulation seeking, irresponsibility, parasitic 
orientation, serious criminal behavior, and criminal versatility.  For example, corporations 
are often aware of the potential harms that their actions may cause, such as death, injury, and 
environmental damage.  However, they continue to engage in the same risky behaviors that 
bring about negative consequences, demonstrating consistency with PCL-R traits such as 
lack of remorse or guilt, lack of empathy, and stimulation seeking.  Corporations attempt to 
mask their internal operations and harmful decisions using impression management 
strategies, especially following public knowledge of their behavior, in order to maintain 
public trust and to be viewed in a socially desirable manner.  In incidents that involve two or 
more different corporations, it was revealed that there is a tendency to blame others for 
problems or to justify risky behaviors, demonstrating a failure to accept responsibility.   
 While this analysis provides some support for corporate psychopathy, there are 
several limitations.  First, this analysis is lacking in a quantifiable sample of corporate 
individuals.  Obtaining the cooperation of business organizations is a major obstacle to this 
area of research (Babiak, Neumann, & Hare, 2010).  Second, this investigation is limited by 
the widespread and repeated nature of corporate offending.  Certainly, the actions of the 
corporations discussed here do not represent the full extent of their wrongdoing.  Also, this 
analysis only focuses on three industries.  Given the widespread nature of corporate crime, it 
is likely that indepth reviews of other industries not included in this analysis would provide 
more insight and additional support for corporate psychopathy.   
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 In addition,  examining the relationship between an individual level construct and 
organizational or group behavior presents its own unique set of challenges.  While 
corporations may be viewed as individuals or organizations, this analysis explores the 
behavior of organizations, providing only limited accounts of individual behavior.  In 
utilizing this approach, we must be mindful of ecological fallacies that might arise if 
unwarranted assumptions are made about individuals who comprise organizations that 
engage in corporate wrongdoing.    
 These findings also propose a number of implications for society and corporations.  
Derber (2002) offers several ways in which the public can be proactive in addressing and 
preventing the negative consequences that can result from the actions of corporations.  These 
include educating yourself and others, boycotting companies that engage in unethical 
behaviors, and participating in organizations aimed at abolishing unethical practices.  In 
addition, criminal justice policies and practices should be reformed so that the law, law 
enforcement, courts, and correctional facilities can better address the issue of corporate 
crime.  Law enforcement should focus more on holding corporate offenders accountable.  
Regulations and criminal sanctions that are more strict and effectively enforced may deter 
corporate offending.  Corporations should be encouraged to maintain a balance between 
goals focused on profitability as well as social responsibility. 
 In regards to future research, this analysis raises several important questions.  What 
influence do factors such as social learning and the competitive corporate environment have 
on corporate behaviors?  Do individuals who work in organizations meet the criteria for 
psychopathy and if so, what factors may make them more likely to do so?  Can psychopathic 
behaviors in corporations be prevented?  Future research on corporate crime and psychopathy 
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should focus more exclusively on individual level analysis of elite deviance utilizing 
corporate samples when possible.  As personality factors play a critical role in white-collar 
and corporate crime (Feeley, 2006; Alalehto, 2003), psychopathy and other personality 
variables should be further explored in the context of corporate crime.  Qualitative endeavors 
similar to this one that focus on other industries or provide a thorough review of only a single 
case may provide more insights into corporate psychopathy, especially in regards to 
psychopathic characteristics that were not able to be substantially illustrated in the current 
analysis.   
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Table 1 
 
Items Measured by the PCL-R and PCL-YV Four-Factor Models 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Interpersonal Factor Affective Factor Lifestyle Factor Antisocial Factor 
Glib/Superficial Lack Remorse or 
Guilt 
Stimulation 
Seeking 
Poor Behavioral 
Controls 
Impression 
Management* 
 
Shallow Affect 
 
Impulsivity 
 
Poor Anger 
Control* 
 
Grandiose Self-
Worth 
 
Callous/Lack 
Empathy 
 
Irresponsible 
 
Early Behavior 
Problems 
 
Pathological Lying 
 
Failure to Accept 
Responsibility 
 
Parasitic 
Orientation 
 
Juvenile 
Delinquency 
 
Conning/ 
Manipulative 
  
Lack of Realistic 
Goals 
 
Serious Criminal 
Behavior* 
    
Revocation of 
Conditional Release 
    
Violation of 
Conditional 
Release* 
    
Criminal Versatility 
Note.  Adopted from “The PCL-R Assessment of Psychopathy” by R. D. Hare & C. S. Neumann in Handbook 
of Psychopathy by C. J. Patrick (Ed.), 2006, pp.77-78. 
*Items only on the PCL-YV. 
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Table 2 
 
Personality Characteristics of Three Rapist Types: Towards a Differentiated Model 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Trait Rapist Type 
 Power-Reassurance Anger-Retaliatory 
 
Sadistic 
Surgency/ 
Extroversion 
MODERATE/HIGH 
(participated in various social 
activities; made friend easily) 
HIGH 
(engaged in a wide variety of 
social activities; had many friends) 
LOW 
(described as a loner; social 
outcast) 
Agreeableness HIGH 
(perceived as kind, good-
natured) 
LOW 
(verbally abusive to family, 
friends, romantic partners) 
LOW 
(had difficulties in social 
relationships) 
Conscientious-
ness 
MODERATE/HIGH 
(owned a successful business, 
attentive to clients, paid close 
attention to details in many 
areas of life) 
MODERATE/HIGH 
(attended college and pursued a 
career upon graduation, paid close 
attention to detail) 
LOW 
(dropped out of college, 
discharged from the military, 
attended school and work 
under the influence of 
alcohol) 
Openness/ 
Intellect 
MODERATE 
(was of average intelligence) 
HIGH 
(excelled in school, open to new 
experiences) 
HIGH 
(Open to new experiences) 
Impulsivity LOW 
(prepared and followed plans) 
HIGH 
(often changed plans suddenly or 
did not plan ahead) 
LOW/MODERATE 
(Most or all crimes were 
premeditated with the 
exception of first murder) 
Novelty/ 
Sensation 
Seeking 
LOW/MODERATE 
(did not seem to participate in 
many risk taking activities) 
HIGH 
(engaged in high risk behaviors, 
reckless driving) 
HIGH 
(engaged in several paraphilic 
behaviors) 
Narcissism HIGH 
(was image conscious, 
materialistic) 
HIGH 
(preoccupied with physical 
appearance, materialistic and 
superficial) 
MODERATE 
(made constant attempts to 
draw attention to himself 
during adolescence) 
Need for 
Intimacy 
HIGH 
(had many social and 
romantic relationships) 
HIGH 
(had many social/romantic 
relationships) 
NOT RATABLE* 
(had a need for intimate 
relationships but never 
seemed to develop an intimate 
bond with anyone) 
Aggression/ 
Hostility 
LOW 
(did not behave in an 
aggressive/anger manner in 
everyday life) 
HIGH/EXCESSIVE 
(behaved extremely aggressive 
toward family, friends, and 
romantic partners) 
LOW/MODERATE 
(behaved aggressively toward 
authority figures) 
Lack of Guilt/ 
Remorse 
HIGH 
(Committed at least 75 sexual 
assaults) 
HIGH 
(Committed several sexual assaults 
before kidnapping, assaulting, and 
murdering two teenage girls) 
HIGH 
(Responsible for the deaths of 
at least 17 men) 
Conning/ 
Manipulative 
HIGH 
(Often tried to enter homes of 
potential victims prior to 
assaults in a non-aggressive 
manner) 
HIGH 
(Often used charm and his physical 
appearance to attract others, lied 
about age to attract younger 
women) 
HIGH 
(Frequented gay bars and bath 
houses and then lured men 
back to his residence, 
convincing of police) 
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